University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2005

Enduring Optimism: Examining the Rig-to-Reef Bargain
Rachael E. Salcido
Pacific McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
32 Ecology L.Q. 863

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Enduring Optimism:
Examining the Rig-to-Reef Bargain
Rachael E. Salcido*

Federal law requires the removal of offshore oil and gas platforms
from the seafloor at the end of production. An exception to this rule allows
a platform to stay on the seafloor if it is incorporatedinto a state artificial
reef program. These "rig-to-reef" projects have been promoted as
innovative public-privatepartnerships that address the dual problems of
costly platform removal and disappearingfishing opportunities. I argue
that the current legal framework fails to ensure habitatenhancement and
may condone ocean dumping. The problem can be traced to three sources:
federal and state competition on the outer continental shelf, lack of a
comprehensive long-term federal vision for outer continental shelf
development, and interest group pressure in the face of scientific
uncertainty.I recommend that we revisit the bargain struck in rig-to-reef
conversions. This article identifies the flaws in current law and proposes a
more robust experimental model to ensure thatpublic benefit is realized in
rig-to-reefprograms.
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ENDURING OPTIMISM
INTRODUCrION

While current scientific research indicates that oil platforms are
better at filling charter fishing boats than improving marine ecosystems,
controversy continues over whether offshore oil platforms can be left on
the seabed when they become obsolete. The abandonment issue is
consequential since there are 6,500 installations worldwide, and removal
1
cost estimates are as high as 40 billion dollars. Yet there is strong public2
in ocean dumpsites.
platforms
oil
opposition to the offshore disposal of
law required that operators remove platforms
Indeed, for decades federal
3
seabed.
the
entirely from
In a peculiar twist of fate, obsolete offshore oil platforms have now
become a fashionable donation from oil companies to coastal states in the
Gulf of Mexico. 4 In Texas and Louisiana, over a hundred platform
jackets-the metal platform 5 legs buried in the seafloor-have been
"recycled" into artificial reefs to provide diving and fishing opportunities

1.

According to some estimates, the potential cost of removing all oil rigs will be between

AND REMOVAL OF
35 and 40 billion U.S. dollars. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., DECOMMISSIONING

FUTURE
OIL AND GAS FACILITIES OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA: RECENT EXPERIENCES AND
& Bonnie
DEEPWATER CHALLENGES, MMS OCS STUDY 98-0023, at 20 (Frank Manago
1997)
Williamson eds., Proceedings from Public Workshop in Ventura, California, Sept. 23-27,
[hereinafter DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA] (comments of W.S. Griffin, Jr.,
technology
Phillips Petroleum Company). Cost estimates continue to evolve as removal
the
improves and larger platforms are placed in deeper waters. See also Peter Cameron, Tackling
10,000
that
(noting
(1999)
121
121,
ENV'T
&
RESOURCES
NAT.
14
Decommissioning Problem,
in time
offshore rigs existed worldwide in 1999). The number of platforms at any given point
is
platforms
new
of
installation
and
platforms
defunct
of
varies, as both decommissioning
ongoing.
public
2. The Brent Spar dispute in Europe, discussed infra Part V.B.3, best illustrates
ON
outcry against the dumping of platforms at offshore ocean dumpsites. See also COMM'N
OF
DISPOSAL
COUNCIL,
RESEARCH
NATIONAL
PLATFORMS,
OFFSHORE
DISPOSITION OF
public
OFFSHORE PLATFORMS 46 (1985) [hereinafter COMM'N ON DISPOSITION] (discussing
by
opinion about the disposal of platforms in the ocean). The committee's work was supported
of
an agreement between the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the National Academy
published
and
platforms
offshore
of
disposition
for
alternatives
the
evaluated
Sciences, which
recommendations for U.S. policy development on the issue in 1985. Respondents to a survey
regarding alternatives to the removal of offshore platforms expressed skepticism of toppling
noted
platforms in place due to a "reluctance to make the ocean a 'junkyard."' Id. The study also
future
of
mortgaging
the
to
as
"expressed
were
environment
the
for
concerns
respondents'
that
opportunities at the expense of simple or cost-effective platform removal options." Id.
3. See infra Part I.B.3, notes 84-88, and accompanying text discussing movement from
complete removal rule to exception for artificial reefs.
for
4. Oil companies enjoy the enhancement of reputation as good environmental actors
their perceived generosity in donating such structures. The Coastal Artificial Reef Planning
Guide notes that entities that donate materials not only receive the benefit of "reduced removal
REEF
or disposal costs" but also receive "favorable publicity." THE JOINT ARTIFICIAL
FISHERIES
MARINE
STATES
GULF
AND
ATLANTIC
THE
OF
COMMITTEE
TECHNICAL
COMMISSIONS, COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE 25 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter
COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE].

5. Webster's dictionary defines a reef: "a line or ridge of sand or rock lying at or near the
surface of the water; as, a coral reef." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
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to recreationists. To a lesser extent, commercial fisherman are also
intended beneficiaries. 6 In the typical arrangement between the oil
company and the state, the oil company donates one-half of the avoided
cost of removal for maintenance of the "reef."'7 The National Fishing
Enhancement Act of 1984 facilitated these arrangements by providing a
specific exception to the removal requirement if a state applies for a
federal permit to use the platform as an artificial reef. 8 These "rig-toreef" projects have been promoted as innovative public-private
partnerships that address the dual problems of costly platform removal
and disappearing fishing opportunities. 9
Not all states have embraced this unique disposal solution. 10 In
contrast to activities in the Gulf of Mexico, California has repeatedly
rejected rig-to-reef conversions as an alternative to platform removal. In
2001, former governor Gray Davis vetoed a bill to facilitate conversions
off the California coast, explaining "[t]here is no conclusive evidence that
converted platforms enhance marine species or produce net benefits to
the environment."' 1 As this precautionary approach reflects, the
DICTIONARY, DELUXE SECOND EDITION 1515 (1983). Natural reefs are
underwater rocks and

coral assemblages, typically near the surface of the water, that support marine
species by
providing foraging areas, relief from predation or rough water conditions, and other
important
services throughout the lifetime of various marine species. Artificial reefs seek to duplicate
these
services.
6. Susan Langenhenning, Gulf Sanctuary, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, June
29,
2003, at 1; Sharon Denny, Oil Platforms Don't Have to Die, They Can Become Living
Reefs, OIL
DAILY, May 6, 1985, at B23.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1725 (2005). See infra Part I on the legal provisions governing removal
of platforms on the OCS.
9. A.J. Mistretta, Oil Rigs Let Oil Companies Save Cash, Help Environmental Image,

NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS, Jan. 27, 2003, at 28; Kenneth R. Weiss, 'Rigs
to Reefs' Plan Stirs

Debate: A Bill to Preserve the Frames of Retired Offshore Oil Platforms as Homes for
Sea Life
Creates New Alliances among Environmentalists,Fishermen, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Sept. 23,
2001, at B1.
10. This regional difference was noted early in the debate over removal options.
See
COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 46 (citing divergent views on the potential
for
platform-converted artificial reefs to enhance fisheries resources). The author's theory
was that
responses expressing a wide range of environmental concerns about different disposal
options
were "regionalized," "reflecting historical perspectives as well as the economic consequences
appreciated by the respective respondents." At that time, interests outside of the Gulf
of Mexico
questioned the enhancement value of platforms on the east and west coasts. Id.
11. S.B. 1, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2000) (vetoed by Governor Gray Davis, Oct. 13, 2001).
SB
1 was not the first bill to promote rig-to-reef conversions in California. See S.B. 241, 1999-2000
Sess. (Cal. 1999) (unenacted); S.B. 2173, 1997-1998 Sess. (Cal. 1998) (unenacted). See
infra Part
V.B.2. A blue ribbon panel was convened to give an opinion as to the environmental
benefits of

rig-to-reef conversions. See SALLY J. HOLBROOK ET AL., SELECT SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON DECOMMISSIONING, THE ECOLOGICAL ISSUES
RELATED TO
DECOMMISSIONING OF CALIFORNIA'S OFFSHORE PRODUCTION PLATFORMS:
REPORT TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MARINE COUNCIL 36 (Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter
SELECT
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING] (concluding that "in
light of the

lack of
strong evidence of benefit and the relatively small contribution of platforms to reef habitat
in the
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environmental benefit of these programs remains speculative and subject
12 Although
to considerable debate within the scientific community.
proponents-primarily the oil industry and marine recreationists-argue
conversions are prudent recycling projects creating valuable fisheries
habitat, 13 others contend that conversions are merely disguised ocean
dumping.

14

In this article, I examine the bargain struck in rig-to-reef conversions,
the uncertainty regarding their effect on marine environment
sustainability, and implications for reform of ocean management. The
interplay of interest groups in the face of scientific uncertainty and the
rise of a social license to operate levied against the oil industry add more
layers of complexity to the question of platform removal. The existing
regulatory structure is a seriously flawed, piecemeal effort that
inadequately addresses the complex issues relevant to offshore disposal
of oil platforms. The cost of platform removal has unduly influenced
relevant laws, which are grounded in the unproven theory that rig-to-reef
programs are an innovative solution to a host of problems. As a
consequence, serious shortcomings in unsustainable fishing and offshore
oil development practices remain largely unaddressed by the rig-to-reef
projects.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: THE DECOMMISSIONING CHALLENGE

A.

The Aging Offshore Oil Infrastructure

The United States depends on fossil fuels to power industry,
transportation and other vital sectors of its economy. An important
source of domestic oil and gas is the outer continental shelf (OCS)-the
submerged land off our shores-which contains proven reserves of these
natural resources. 15 Large drilling platforms are placed on the OCS to
region, evaluation of decommissioning alternatives in our opinion should not be based on the
assumption that platforms currently enhance marine resources").
12. Governor Davis noted that this theory of environmental benefit is not widely accepted
by the scientific community. Cal. S.B. 1 veto. See discussion infra Part V.B.2 on scientific debate.
Whether the structures provide habitat continues to be controversial, particularly where manmade reefs create habitats that are quite different from the original fisheries habitat. "The use of
artificial reefs as mitigation for loss of dissimilar habitat has been and will continue to be a
controversial topic." NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DRAFT NATIONAL
ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN REVISION 42-43 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL
REEF PLAN OF 2002].

13. See infra Part III.B.1.
14. This has long been the crux of the debate over all forms of artificial reefs, which had
been used as a solid waste disposal alternative in the past. See John MacDonald, Artificial Reef
Debate: Habitat Enhancement or Waste Disposal?, 25 OCEAN DEV & INT'L L. 87 (1994)
(discussing the use of incinerator ash, tires and platforms as artificial reefs).
15. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act defines "outer Continental Shelf" as "all
as
submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters
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produce oil and natural gas. Today there are approximately 4,000
offshore oil rigs on the OCS, almost all in the Gulf of Mexico, with the
rest off the coast of the Pacific Ocean. 16 In fact, the early years of the
twenty-first century saw an increase in offshore drilling in United States
coastal waters, with the George W. Bush administration strongly
encouraging domestic oil and gas production on public lands, both on and
offshore. t7
Partly due to the emphasis on domestic production, the amount of
offshore oil and gas as a percentage of national supply is projected to
continue to increase in the short term. 18 Recent technological advances
that facilitate extreme deepwater drilling operations have contributed
significantly to the influx of petroleum from offshore sources.1 9

defined in section 1301 of this title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the
United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control .... " 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2000).
U.S.
jurisdiction to utilize OCS resources extends to 200 miles from the shore in an exclusive
economic zone. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, art. 57 (1982), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
16. MMS, Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities
in Federal Waters: 1953-03 (citing TIMS Quarterly Reports, Aug. 5,
2005),
http://www.mms.gov/stats/xlsExcel/PlatformSummary-1942_2004.xls [hereinafter
MMS
OFFSHORE FACILITIES REPORT] (showing 3,944 installations, 3,921 on the Gulf
of Mexico OCS
and twenty-three on the Pacific OCS (California)).
17. Sam Fletcher, US Drilling Surge Will Continue Into the Year, OIL & GAS J., May
19,
2003, at 49-50; Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration and the Environment:
An
Overview and Introduction, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (2003) (discussing
the Bush
administration's tactics and promotion of extractive industries, such as oil and gas);
See also
Douglas Jehl, Where Bison Meets Oil Rig, Talk of Cooperation,N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001,
at 14
(discussing the Bush administration's emphasis on domestic oil and gas production,
even on
public lands); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands,
26
ECOLOGY L. Q. 140, 158-59 (1999) (discussing the general decline in oil and gas drilling
on
public lands from the 1970s through the 1990s).
18. In addition to industry and energy expert opinions, government press releases
and
other public documents published by the DOI and Minerals Management Service
(MMS)
support this forecast. See, e.g., BalancingEnergy Needs and EnvironmentalHealth, MMS
OCEAN
SCIENCE, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 5 (graphing OCS oil production and projecting increased production
in the next decade). In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, the offshore oil and gas industry's
downstream production has been primarily affected. Refineries are unable to process crude
into
consumer products due to the evacuation of employees in Louisiana and Mississippi
and the
destruction to refinery and supply infrastructure. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THIS WEEK
IN
PETROLEUM, Aug. 31, 2005, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/050831/
twipprint.html.
19.

MINERALS MGMT. SERV., DEEP WATER: WHERE THE ENERGY IS 4 (2004)
("With

deep water production expected to almost double over the next decade, Gulf oil production
will
rise to 2.25 million barrels per day, or nearly 80% of total Gulf production, by
2011.");
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., DEEPWATER DEVELOPMENT FACTS (Jan. 1999)
[hereinafter MMS

DEEPWATER DEV. FACTS]; See also Paul Eisenstein, Giant Oil Platforms, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Jan. 13, 2004 (showing capabilities of offshore oil rigs at depths exceeding
6,600
feet), available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/extrememachines/1280836.html.
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20
Deepwater drilling is an important area for future oil exploration The
United States has encouraged deepwater exploration in the Gulf of
Mexico, with Congress enacting a Deepwater Royalty Relief Act to spur
private investment in exploration and drilling beyond depths of 200
meters. 2' As the search for deepwater oil and gas reserves continues,
22
more platforms will be required at greater depths. The trend in offshore
and the use of
drilling is universal, as the rate of offshore oil production
23
worldwide.
offshore oil rigs has increased significantly
Yet, while the industry is engaged in considerable exploration and
production efforts in deepwater areas, the industry is faced with hundreds24
capacity.
of aging platforms that are now approaching their production
have
increasingly
Thus, the United States and its oil industry lessees will
to confront the issues posed 25by the vast number of offshore drilling
platforms reaching retirement.
The process of winding down offshore production is called
"decommissioning," which includes shutting down all operations,
plugging the wells, dismantling the offshore fixtures, and disposing of
waste materials. 26 Over the next decade, even while additional platforms
for oil production are erected on the OCS, a thousand rigs in the Gulf of
27
Mexico will be retired by their owners. Furthermore, government and

20.

MMS DEEPWATER DEv. FACTS, supra note 19, at 2; U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN

21.

Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-58,

357 (2004)
POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT
[hereinafter OCEAN COMM'N REPORT].

U.S.C. §
109 Stat. 557 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1337 (2000)); 43

if it is
1337(a)(3)(C)(ii). The Secretary of Interior has authority to waive royalty payments
uneconomical to explore otherwise.
22.

which
Furthermore, the discovery of other natural resources such as methane hydrates,

may provide a source of energy as well as projected interest in deepwater ocean mining, and

in the future.
renewable energy projects could also increase the number of structures installed

See OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 364-67.
23. HOSSEIN ESMAEILI, THE LEGAL REGIME OF OFFSHORE OIL RIGS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 12 (2001).
24. MICHAEL VINCENT McGINNIS ET AL., UNIV. OF CALIF., SANTA BARBARA, THE
OIL AND GAS
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ECOLOGY OF DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE

STRUCTURES, MMS OCS STUDY 2001-006 at 78 (Minerals Mgmt. Serv. 2001) [hereinafter
200
MCG INNIS

ET

AL.], available at http://www.coastalresearchcenter.ucsb.edu/cmi/files/

1-

006.pdf.
25. A 2001 report forecasts a 29 percent decline in number of platforms in the Gulf of
Mexico over the period from 1999 to 2023. ALLAN G. PULSIPHER ET AL., CENTER FOR ENERGY

ON THE
STUDIES, LA. STATE UNIV., FORECASTING THE NUMBER OF OFFSHORE PLATFORMS
Mgmt.
(Minerals
1
at
2001-013
MMS
STUDY
OCS
2023,
GULF OF MEXICO OCS TO THE YEAR

Serv., Apr. 2001).
26. The onshore structures associated with offshore drilling operations must also be shut
down when offshore operations cease. This article does not consider the decommissioning of
onshore facilities, where the costs are more certain, manageable, and environmental impact
more clear.
27. Most of the approximately 4,000 platforms erected on the U.S. OCS are in the Gulf of
Mexico, and in the Gulf of Mexico more than one-quarter of the remaining platforms are over
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industry planning for decommissioning of twenty-three platforms
offshore California is now underway. 28
Naturally, the considerable expense attributable to decommissioning
invites a discussion about alternatives for the disposition of production
structures. 29 Cost estimates for removal range from $50,000 (short
platforms in very shallow waters) to $15 million (tall platforms in the
deepest waters) per platform. 30 Imagine an underwater Eiffel Tower,
Empire State Building or Statue of Liberty.31 Dismantling these giant
underwater structures requires the use of large ocean cranes and barges. 32
And while the platform and many of its working parts can occasionally be
reused at a different location for drilling operations, 33 the platform jacket
is often very costly to remove, has no real prospect for reuse, and may
twenty-five years old. It is estimated that more than one thousand structures may be removed
from the Gulf area this decade. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 78; MMS OFFSHORE
FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 16.
28. A recent estimate puts the total cost for removing the 23 platforms in the POCSR at
$1,007,699,000 (2004 dollars). MINERALS MGMT. SERV., OFFSHORE
FACILITY
DECOMMISSIONING COSTS: PACIFIC OCS REGION at ii (Sept. 17, 2004) [hereinafter PACIFIC
OCS REGION DECOMMISSIONING COSTS], available at http://www.mms.gov/omm/pacific/
lease/2004_final-decommissioning-cost-report-rev l.pdf. The report includes costs of plugging
wells, removing platform jackets and decks, clearing the site, and other costs of compliance with
lease requirements and permit provisions. Id. at i.
29. In the United States, oil companies are committed to remove production fixtures
contractually at the outset of OCS leases. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Oil and Gas Lease
of
Submerged Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Form MMS-2005, sec. 22
(Mar. 1986) [hereinafter MMS Lease Form] (requiring complete removal). However, some
suggest that many companies did not anticipate the extent of the costs, nor allocate specific funds
for this future liability. See, e.g., Samir Mankabady, Decommissioningof Offshore Installations,
28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 603, 603 (1997). Mankabady notes that oil companies used to set aside
funds for future decommissioning and review such sums yearly. However, given the diverse size
and weight of platforms, determining the amount of money required for decommissioning was
elusive. He also suggests that the rising price of oil and improved secondary recovery methods
pushed this issue out of the forefront of oil companies' concerns. Id. at 604.
30. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 20. Estimated average disposal cost per
platform ranges depending on its depth. The committee evaluated platform removal cost
by
depth categories. Category I included structures in 0 to 20 feet, with projected costs of $50,000
to
$400,000 per platform. Category II included structures in 20 to 100 feet, projected cost ranges
were $600,000 to $1.3 million per platform. Category III evaluated structures in 100 to 200 feet,
projected costs of $1 million to $ 2.5 million per platform. Category IV, platforms in 200 to
400
feet, ranges average $5 million to $15 million per platform. Major costs include blasting and
towing, and could be reduced if multiple platforms were decommissioned simultaneously.
31.

DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 10, 20.

32. Mark J. Kaiser, FASB 143 Rules Will Change Decommission Liability,OIL & GAS J.,
Mar. 14, 2005, at 43 (discussing the mechanics and costs of decommissioning); ESAU R.
VELAZQUEZ & ROBERT C. BYRD, GULF OF MEXICO DEEPWATER PLATFORM
DECOMMISSIONING, OTC DOC. No. 15,113 (2003) (discussing the mechanics of various
decommissioning options).
33. EPA encourages recycling of platform materials. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note
2, at 48 (citing Letter from Tudor Davies, EPA, to W.M. Benkert (Nov. 27, 1984); See MCGINNIS
ET AL. supra note 24, at 44 ("[A] potential market for the distribution and reuse of equipment
between industry players and not simply within one company's operations, must be explored
further.").
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have little scrap value. 34 Thus, the platform jacket must be brought back
35
to shore and disposed of on land. The ability to drill in ever 36deeper
stage.
waters, of course, exacerbates these removal costs in the end
The technical feasibility of removing platforms has not been a
37
problem in American coastal waters, at least thus far. But experience
from dismantling North Sea infrastructure suggests that trouble lies
38
ahead for future U.S. deepwater decommissioning. In the North Sea,
offshore platforms are often much larger and located in deeper water
39
than their American counterparts thus far decommissioned. Significant
34. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 17. The authors note that individual parts of
the platform deck equipment can be easily refurbished and reused, such as cranes, generators,
buildings, and heliports. However, the report notes that "structural portions of the jacket and
deck are not as reusable as the deck equipment." Id. They cite "different soil conditions" as
requiring different designs for the foundation of new platforms. Id. at 18. "Since most platforms
are not suitable for reuse as platforms, they must be scrapped on shore or at sea." Id. McGinnis
concludes that scrapping of steel is the most likely outcome, while land-filling of other material
will probably occur. "The overwhelming bulk of the waste stream generated from
decommissioning platforms is the steel from jackets." A smaller portion of the waste stream for
California platforms that will probably end up in landfills consists of concrete, insulating
materials, and mud. McGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 45.
35. In the United States, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)
strictly regulates ocean disposal of wastes to prevent harm to the marine environment. Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, § 2. 86 Stat. 1052 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 33 U.S.C.). It is difficult to obtain legal
permission to discard of waste materials in the ocean, which requires a permit from the
Environmental Protection Agency. See Charles B. Anderson, Ocean Dumping and the Marine
Protection,Research and SanctuariesAct, 1 LOY. MAR. L J. 79. 92 (2002) (arguing that MPRSA
eschews a cost-benefit analysis). To date, the federal government's policy requires removal or
conversion to an artificial reef. See infra notes 85-86.
36. See generallyMMS DEEPWATER DEV. FACTS, supra note 19; Press Release, Minerals
Management Service (MMS), Deepwater: A New Frontier for Resource Management (May 18,
2000) (noting the increase in deepwater drilling); Press Release, MMS, Number of Rigs Drilling
In Deepwater Gulf Reaches Record High of 42 (Apr. 19, 2001); Press Release, MMS, Gulf
Deepwater Sees Major Advance in 2004; Records Set (Jan. 31, 2005) (touting major advances in
Gulf of Mexico deepwater drilling, and noting that six of the fourteen new deepwater startups
were floating production facilities); COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 20.
37. See MMS OFFSHORE FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 16 (showing that 2,606
installations have been removed from the GOM OCS, and one removed from the Pacific OCS).
38. Mankabady, supra note 29, at 611. Mankabady noted that, in 1997, "decommissioning is
still in its infancy: only 9 of the 220 installations in the British sector have been removed." Id. at
615.
39. Most decommissioning has thus far occurred in the shallow waters of the Gulf of
Mexico, however, in the next ten years significantly more decommissioning will be required in
the deep waters of the Gulf and offshore California. For predictions on the removal of offshore
platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, see PULSIPHER ET AL., supra note 25. For a recent log of
permanent offshore platforms placed offshore on the GOM OCS at greater than 1,000 feet, see
MMS, Gulf of Mexico Permanent Deepwater Structures, http://www.gomr.mms.gov/
homepg/offshore/deepwatr/dpstruct.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2005). See also
DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 9-12 (noting that
decommissioning of deepwater structures will soon be coming to the forefront in California and
the Gulf of Mexico). For estimates of decommissioning costs for platforms offshore California,
see PACIFIC OCS REGION DECOMMISSIONING COSTS, supra note 28 (discussing costs associated
with decommissioning projects projected for the time period 2010 to 2025).
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problems have been encountered in removing these deepwater
structures. 40 Consequently, removal activities have been delayed and
often put on hold in the North Sea. 4' Each removal project is a unique
and difficult engineering undertaking, as platforms were not necessarily
designed for removal. Therefore, experts are concerned that feasibility
may be a problem in the United States as decommissioning occurs in
deeper waters, such as those offshore California. 42
The cost of removal has an undeniably strong influence on existing
rig-to-reef policy. 43 An important industry objective is minimizing the

cost of decommissioning. 44 This is why oil companies choose to remove
platforms when it is less costly to do so than engage in rig-to-reef projects.
As further discussed in the following section, oil companies have
committed to removal, but ultimately failed to undertake adequate
planning to implement this commitment. 45 Once decommissioning was
40. Technical problems encountered in decommissioning projects include engineering
removal of heavy steel structures, cutting off and/or pulling out the legs of the platforms from
the seafloor, and conducting these operations safely with concern for personnel on floating
equipment, divers, and marine life in the vicinity. The most well-publicized platform removal
challenge involved a deepwater oil storage rig in the North Sea. See id. at 612-13 (discussing the
Brent Spar incident); ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 191-92.
41. ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 218 ("Since the Brent Spar incident both companies and
governments have been attempting to delay the decommissioning of the big oil platforms in the
North Sea..." after operations cease).
42. Decommissioning in the Pacific OCS region will involve deepwater installations, which
MMS notes will include "significant technical, safety, environmental, and material disposal
challenges. From a technical standpoint, the technology has yet to be developed to remove
certain deepwater structures. This is particularly true in water depths exceeding 400 feet."
DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 9. Cameron notes that there may
be little transferability of the U.S. decommissioning experience-legal and technical-to other
parts of the world. "The high cost of removal in deeper water and the extensive role of
governments in petroleum operations in most countries generate many differences from the Gulf
of Mexico." Cameron, supra note 1, at 121.
43. See infra note 46 and accompanying text discussing industry lobbying to change
international law due to the high cost of removal.
44. The rig-to-reef option is pursued by oil companies when it is less costly than removal.
The Rigs to Reefs Act of 2003 that failed to pass through Congress sought to amend the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to encourage conversions by further clarifying the liability issue,
and by providing a tax break to oil companies who maintain the platform after the expiration of
the lease and prior to title transfer to the state artificial reef program. H.R. 2654, 108th Cong.
(2003). Early policy studies determined that the industry needed more than just a "good public
relations" boost to participate in these programs. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 51.
The rig-to-reef option "is likely to be pursued only to the extent that the cost to the structure
owner for artificial reef development does not exceed the cost of other options." Id. The original
National Artificial Reef Plan (NARP) also noted that "[e]conomic considerations will continue
to be most important in the disposal decision process," and since relocation is typically very
expensive, "these costs will be compared with other disposal optior3." NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN, NOAA NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN, NOAA TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM NMFS OF-6, at 17 (Richard B. Stone ed., 1985) [hereinafter NOAA
ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985].

45. As noted by a federal official in a public workshop discussing anticipated technical
challenges in decommissioning platforms off California's coast, now that the time for removal
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imminent, the industry undertook aggressive efforts to scale back its legal
obligations to remove defunct platforms. The government has been
willing to amend legal removal obligations given the scientific uncertainty
of environmental impacts and dependence on oil. However, public
opinion has been very influential in pressuring oil companies to abide by
their previous commitments. Due to public backlash against proposed
ocean dumping of platforms, public acceptance of disposal options is now
an express part of any discussion about removal options. The debate over
decommissioning options has thus been transformed to focus on cost,
6
environmental impact, and public acceptance of disposal options.
Because public opinion rejects the use of ocean dumpsites the debate has
shifted to the next less costly alternative: recycling platforms as artificial
reefs or other uses.
B.

The Vacillating U.S. Approach to Platform Removal Policy

There are many conflicting influences on the development of U.S.
policy regarding the disposition of offshore platforms. A glimpse at the
progression of attitudes on energy policy and environmental stewardship
helps to illustrate these conflicts. Unpacking the various layers of
legislation reveals a complex, evolving policy. The debate over platform
removal occurs within this larger context of different attitudes and legal
reforms.
1.

Cultural Influences on Platform Removal Policy

Although the debate over the ultimate disposition of offshore
platforms is relatively new, offshore drilling has always been
controversial in American politics. 47 A central theme of ongoing
has come, "[tihe onshore infrastructure required to dispose of these massive steel structures also
may not exist, which may necessitate consideration of other options such as converting the
structures to artificial reefs or other uses." DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra

note 1, at 10.
46. See, e.g., COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2; MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at
78; DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra note 1; The oil industry wanted to revisit
the removal requirement when the third convention on the Law of the Sea was negotiated,

pointing to the high cost of removal in deepwater. Richard J. McLaughlin, Coastal State
Discretion, U.S. Policy,and the New IMO Guidelinesfor the Disposalof Offshore Structures:Has
Article 5(5) of the 1958 ContinentalShelf Convention Been "EntirelyRemoved?" 1 TERR. SEA J.
245, at 246, 251 (1991) (discussing Proposed International Standards to Ensure Safety of
Navigation, submitted by the Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum to
IMO Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 33rd Session, IMO Doc.Nav. 33/7 (1986)).
47. See generally EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION:
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (Lexington Books

2001) (discussing legal challenges involving debate over development of the outer continental
shelf). See also R. SCOTT FARROW, MANAGING THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS:

OCEANS O F CONTROVERSY (Taylor & Francis 1990) (discussing controversial aspects of
managing the outer continental shelf). In 1995, public protest over the proposed disposal of a
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controversy is the struggle between coastal states and the federal
government over offshore energy development, known as the "Seaweed
Rebellion."' 48 As more fully explored in Part IV.B. infra, states have
jurisdiction over the coastline out to three miles from the shore, while the
49
federal government has jurisdiction beyond that legal border.
In recent years, coastal states' and the general public's concern about
the environmental impact of offshore drilling has profoundly impacted
OCS development and drilling practices. 50 While it is true that offshore
drilling has increased significantly, it is primarily occurring in deepwater
areas of the Gulf of Mexico. 51 This regional drilling focus has developed
as a consequence of the political influence of some coastal states'
Congress members. A moratorium on leasing offshore lands for oil and
gas exploration is now in place in all but the central and eastern areas of
52
the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska.
The current increase in attention to the deplorable state of
overfished ocean fisheries and marine environment degradation also
influences attitudes about offshore drilling. Decades of overfishing,
pollution, development, and destruction of habitat have created a "crisis
in our oceans" leaving many marine species populations and entire

large oil platform, the Brent Spar, in a North Sea disposal site ignited debate across Europe and
brought the issue back into international dialogues. See Mankabady, supra note 29, at 612-13;
ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 190-91, 212-14. Some argue that removal and onshore disposal of
platforms is a "core strategic objective" for environmentalists, ocean activists, and policymakers.
ALLAN G. PULSIPHER & WILLIAM B. DANIEL IV, CENTER FOR ENERGY STUDIES, LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY, ONSHORE DISPOSITION OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS PLATFORMS:
WESTERN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (report based on presentation at APEC

workshop on platform decommissioning in Jakarta, Indonesia in October 1998).
48. See generallyFITZGERALD, supra note 47 (discussing history and development of
state-federal conflicts over offshore resources).
49. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1 on the historic and ongoing state-federal conflict on
the OCS.
50. See Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer
Continental Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 75 (1992) (providing an in depth discussion and critique of the
framework of environmental regulation on the OCS).
51. MMS OFFSHORE FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 16.
52. The President has the authority to withdraw any unleased lands of the OCS. Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000). The moratorium was declared by
President George H.W. Bush, and was extended by President William J. Clinton. As it stands,
the moratorium will last until 2012 unless it is subsequently extended by the President. Each year
since, Congress has prevented spending on development of oil and gas through appropriations
riders. More generally, the issue of environmental degradation has achieved a foothold in
national energy policy discussions. See David J. Hayes, Energy, Again -But with a Kicker, 16
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 215 (2002) (noting environmental considerations at the center of
Bush energy policy development); Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing
Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (2002) (noting that the difficulty of
developing an energy policy "is increasingly an unremitting challenge because it is inextricably
linked to environmental issues").
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ecosystems at risk.53 Although overlooked for decades, the declining
health of the oceans has now been recognized, resulting in calls for
management policy reform. 54 Recent federal and state legislative
enactments have been directed at determining how to manage and
rebuild ocean health, recognizing the importance of the world's oceans as
the provider of numerous invaluable ecosystem services. Congress took a
very important step at the beginning of this century, calling for an expert
appraisal of ocean health and management. The Oceans Act of 2000 (the
"Oceans Act") provided for the organization and funding of the United
States Commission on Ocean Policy (the "Ocean Commission"). 55 The
Ocean Commission was charged with recommending improvements to
the existing ineffective ocean management regime and making
suggestions for addressing the crisis in ocean health caused by human
impacts. 56 The Ocean Commission also had to give input on how to
resolve ongoing state and federal conflict over offshore drilling.5 7 The
Ocean Commission's "Ocean Blueprint for the 21 s Century" makes
sweeping recommendations for overhauling current oceans law to
58
encourage long-term sustainability of this valuable natural resource.
Legislative action on all of these recommendations has not been swift,
59
but some of the measures have received attention with lawmakers.
States have also renewed activities concentrated on improving marine
health. 6° Certainly, public awareness of this problem is increasing, and it
is receiving a long-overdue, if still modest, amount of legislative attention.
Meanwhile, U.S. energy demands continue to outpace the domestic
supply of fossil fuels, inducing reliance on imports to fill ever-growing oil

53. See PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE
FOR SEA CHANGE 2-9 (2003) [hereinafter PEW REPORT] (identifying the following "major
threats" to the oceans: nonpoint and point source pollution, invasive species, aquaculture,
coastal development, overfishing, habitat alteration, bycatch, and climate change, and further
discussing the decline in populations of several marine species, increases in diseases, and the
negative effects on other species in the ecosystem that rely on them).
54. See id. at 102-126 (making recommendations for change in the management of the
ocean's resources).
55. Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 648 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §
857-19).
56. See id. § 2; Robin Kundis Craig, Regulation of U.S. Marine Resources:An Overview of
the CurrentComplexity, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4 (2004) (stating how regulations need
to be more coordinated to comprehensively protect marine resources).
57. Craig, supra note 56, at 4.
58. See OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 472-522 (providing a complete list of
recommendations appearing throughout the report).
59. The proposals on aquaculture have been well discussed, as well as the potential for
research and additional siting of fixed structures. See National Offshore Aquaculture Act of
2005, S. 1195, 109th Cong. (2005).
60. California's Marine Life Protection Act is one important state initiative to rebuild the
health of ocean ecosystems. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2850-2863 (Deering 2005).
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and natural gas demands. 61 Movement toward alternative and renewable
energy sources and sustainable energy policy has been glacial. As a
consequence, escalating interest in minimizing reliance on foreign oil as
well as technological advances in deepwater drilling operations
encourage increased domestic offshore production. 62 Platform removal
following offshore production is a considerable expense. Areas offshore
the United States would be more profitable (and thus potentially more
attractive to industry) if multi-million dollar removal obligations were
eliminated.
2.

InternationalRules RegardingPlatform Removal

The obligation of the United States under international law for
disposal of offshore platforms is governed by the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea and the London Dumping Convention. 63 International
law on the issue of platform removal is unsettled, but has moved away
from strict removal and toward coastal nation discretion. 64 When the
61. The sizable divide between U.S. energy policy and the growing energy demand in this
country is well documented. For a recent discussion recommending ways to facilitate increased
offshore drilling to close the import gap, see Kim Harb, The Legal and Policy Dilemma of
Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 23 (2004) (noting a "vast
disconnect in this country between our energy needs and our energy policies"). On the other
hand, those who promote sustainable use of natural resources promote expansion of alternative
and renewable energy sources as well as appropriate conservation efforts to develop a
sustainable energy policy.
62. The recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005 requires that the Secretary of Energy
prepare an inventory of oil and natural gas resources beneath all of the waters of the United
States OCS, specifically calling for the inventory and analysis to "use any available technology,
except drilling, but including 3-D seismic technology to obtain accurate resource estimates ......
Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 357(a)(2), 119 Stat. 594, 720 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15912).
Many see this type of inventory process as a precursor to exploration and drilling. See Bart
Jansen, End to Drilling Ban Viewed as Threat to Georges Bank: Senate Approval of Exploration
for Oil and Gas Reserves Rekindles a Controversy,MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, June 22, 2003,
at 1A. On the other hand, it may encourage agitation for continued moratorium. Apart from the
inventory, other incentives in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 were directed to increase domestic
production of oil and gas, such as royalty relief and tax subsidies. See Press Release, Minerals
Management Service (MMS), 2005 Energy Policy Act Grants MMS New Authority and Includes
Incentives for Increased Domestic Energy Production (Aug. 8, 2005).
63. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force June 10, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter UNCLOS I]; Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, entry
into force Aug. 30, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London Dumping
Convention]; U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. The
United States has not yet acceded to the UNCLOS III, thus its international obligations are even
further uncertain at this time given the arguable operation of the UNCLOS I to which it is a
party.
64. A few reasons for this uncertainty exist: the most recent law of the sea convention has
not been joined by all nations, some nations have entered into regional treaties that are more
restrictive, and state practice relevant in defining international law has not yet emerged clearly.
See Rosalyn Higgins QC, Abandonment of Energy Sites and Structures: Relevant International
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international community first began to discuss this question, concern for
unhindered commercial and military navigation led to a strict removal
requirement: the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, to which the
United States is a party, required that any abandoned or disused offshore
installation be "entirely removed. '65 The United States engaged in
further international dialogue about the growing problem of ocean
dumping in the 1970s. 66 The United States participated in negotiations on
the London Dumping Convention, which focused on the prevention of
marine pollution. 67 The United States adopted the provisions of the
London Dumping Convention (LDC), which is specifically designed to
prevent degradation of oceans by international dumping. 68 The LDC
prohibits disposing of offshore structures at sea, but allows "placement of
matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof...." 69
By the end of the 1970s, some of the large offshore platforms had
completely drained the wells they serviced and decommissioning was
imminent. 70 Negotiations on the 1982 Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) culminated in discretionary
authority to coastal states to decide whether disused offshore structures
must be entirely removed. 71 Article 60(3) of the UNCLOS III allowed
coastal states to "take into account any generally accepted international
standards established in this regard by the competent international
72
organization."
One such "competent international organization," the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), adopted guidelines and standards for the
removal of offshore structures on the continental shelf and in the 200
mile area bordering a coastal nation known as the exclusive economic

Law, 11 J. ENERGY & NATURAL RES. L. 6 (1993) (discussing the state of international law on

the question of platform removal and rigs-to-reefs).
65. UNCLOS I, supra note 63, art. 5(5) (establishing this strict removal provision).
66. John Warren Kindt, Solid Wastes and Marine Pollution,34 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 76-81
(1984).
67. The 1972 London Dumping Convention considers disposal of offshore platforms as sea
dumping, unless the platform is placed for an alternate purpose. London Dumping Convention,
supra note 63, art. III(1)(a), (1)(b)(ii). The 1996 Protocol to the convention arguably "tightens
up" dumping restrictions. See Elizabeth A. Kirk, The 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping
Convention and the Brent Spar, 46 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 957, 963 (1997). The MPRSA was amended

in 1974 to conform to the treaty obligations of the LDC. See Act of Mar. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-254, § 1(1), 88 Stat. 50.
68. London Dumping Convention, supra note 63 (proclaiming ratification by United States
on Sept. 25, 1973).
69. Art. III(1)(a) prohibits dumping, while art. III(1)(b) allows alternative uses. Id.
70. Cameron, supra note 1, at 121 (noting industry has been aware of looming problem of
decommissioning).
71. UNCLOS III, supra note 63.
72. Id. art. 60(3). The United States has not yet ratified the UNCLOS III treaty. President
George W. Bush endorsed the treaty and it has been moved to the Senate for approval. The
Senate has expressed reservations about entering into a treaty that will limit U.S. sovereignty.
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zone (EEZ). 73 The IMO guidelines promote a case-by-case approach to
the removal question, considering navigation, impact on the environment,
as well as cost and potential new uses. Under these guidelines, certain
instances of platform ocean dumping are allowed where the platform's
size is large and the environmental consequences are judged to be
acceptable. 74 Furthermore, IMO guideline 3.4.1 contemplates that a
coastal state may approve the conversion of a platform to a new use, such
as an artificial reef, for the enhancement of a living resource. 75 However,
the IMO has also adopted a recommendation that platforms installed on
the OCS be designed for complete removal, diminishing the strength of
76
future arguments claiming lack of feasibility.
The United States, warning about ocean dumping, urged the IMO to
excuse platform removal only where "a bona fide legitimate new
purpose" is feasible. And even as to this, the delegation advocated a 2
percent maximum use of the new use exception. 77 But these efforts failed.
Not only was the United States unsuccessful in convincing other nations
to incorporate this approach into international treaties, domestic law
never recognized these limitations. 78 Nor did domestic law adopt the legal
79
requirement regarding design for complete removal.
The relaxation of the removal rule in international law to case-bycase evaluation has raised concerns about the significant discretion of
coastal nations to abandon portions of obsolete platforms in place.80 One
scholar warned of the influence of special interest groups in this context
and potential harm to international navigational rights. 8 1 In particular,
some nations may facilitate the evasion of removal requirements by
overemphasizing both removal costs and the value of "new uses"
assigned to obsolete platforms.8 2 Unlike some of the other new uses
suggested by entrepreneurs (such as floating hotels, prisons, or research
observation centers), the exception for an artificial reef carries
heightened concern that nations may designate a "new use" without
technical merit given the scientific uncertainty regarding the effects on
73. Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on
the Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone, Int'l Maritime Org. 16th Ass. Res.
A.672, MSC 57/27/Add.2, Annex 31 (Oct. 19, 1989) [hereinafter IMO Guidelines].
74. Id. at 2.1.1-2.1.5.
75. Id. at 3.4.1.
76. Id. at 3.13 (requiring that any structure erected after January 1, 1998 be designed for
complete removal).
77. McLaughlin, supra note 46, at 251-52, 260.
78. See id. at 263.
79. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
80. See McLaughlin, supra note 46, at 249 (characterizing coastal state discretion as
excessive and potentially problematic for U.S. interests).
81. McGlaughlin was concerned that the navigational rights of the international community
were at risk and criticized vague standards and reliance on case-by-case evaluations. Id. at 266.
82. Id. at 264.
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the environment of any given "artificial reef."' 83 The United States is not
immune from these concerns. Furthermore, the question of whether it is
wise to encourage a proliferation of fixed structures on the OCS when the
ocean's health is in spiraling decline is not being addressed by the current
focus on cost and individual environmental impact from each rig-to-reef
conversion.
3.

Domestic Legislation RegardingPlatform Removal

The domestic law governing platform removal is primarily contained
in three federal statutes: the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the
National Fishing Enhancement Act and the Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuary Act. 84 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
is a mature statute that governs all aspects of offshore drilling. The
original act was updated in 1976 to include more attention to the
environmental impacts of offshore drilling. Pursuant to OCSLA, the
agency that oversees offshore development-the Minerals Management
Service (MMS) within the Department of Interior (DOI)-adopted
regulations requiring the removal of oil platforms within one year of the
cessation of production from the platform.85 Mirroring these regulations,
standard lease provisions between the federal government and oil
company lessees required the removal of all platforms from the ocean
86
floor. In 1984 the National Fishing Enhancement Act was adopted,

83. Id. McGlaughlin noted that the discretion given to coastal nations meant that it was
possible that "[r]egardless of technical merit, a coastal state could designate any abandoned
structure as an aid to the enhancement of living resources and allow it to remain in place." Id. at
264.
84. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1331-1356 (2000); National
Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-623, 98 Stat. 3394 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1220
(2000) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (2000)); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-532, § 2, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and
33 U.S.C.). As discussed infra Part V.A, because of the fragmentation and complexity of ocean
law, including overlapping jurisdictional issues, many other statutes with tangential application
are implicated by the removal question. These include the Endangered Species Act (prohibiting
the killing of covered species), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (regulating certain ocean
activities affecting protected mammals), and the National Environmental Policy Act (requiring
an environmental impact report for any major federal project that has a significant impact on the
environment). See infra Parts II and IV discussing statutes bearing on the development of
artificial reefs.
85. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.1725 (2005) (implemented pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1334).
86. MMS Lease Form, supra note 29, § 22 ("Removal of Property on Termination of
Lease. Within a period of one year after termination of this lease in whole or in part, the Lessee
shall remove all devices, works, and structures from the premises no longer subject to the lease
in accordance with applicable regulations and Orders of the Director. However, the Lessee may,
with the approval of the Director, continue to maintain devices, works, and structures on the
leased area for drilling or producing on other leases."). Federal regulations dictate removal
within the one-year period from termination of the lease or pipeline right-of-way, unless
approval is obtained to use the structure for other activities. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1725(a).
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providing a specific artificial reef exception to the rule that platforms
must be removed. 87 MMS amended its regulations accordingly. 88
The third relevant statute governs the disposal of material at sea
generally. The United States took its first serious steps toward domestic
regulation of ocean dumping by enacting the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), commonly known as
the "Ocean Dumping Act. '89 Pursuant to the MPRSA,
the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the disposal of
materials in the ocean. As discussed above, the London Dumping
Convention prohibits disposing of offshore structures (like oil rigs) at sea,
but allows "placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere
disposal thereof." 90 This approach is also consistent with ocean dumping
standards under the MPRSA. The Act defines "dumping" as including a
number of practices, but specifically adding that "it does not mean the
construction of any fixed structure or artificial island nor the intentional
placement of any device in ocean waters or on or in the submerged land
beneath such waters, for a purpose other than disposal, when such
construction or such placement is otherwise regulated by Federal or State
law or occurs pursuant to an authorized Federal or State program...." 91
There is also a dispensation for emergencies. 92

87.
88.
89.

See discussion infra Part III on NFEA.
See infra Part II.A.2.
The Council on Environmental Quality noted the problem of ocean pollution in an

influential report. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCEAN DUMPING: A

NATIONAL POLICY (1970). For discussions of the development of ocean dumping laws, see
Steven J. Moore, Troubles in the High Seas: A New Era in the Regulation of U.S. Ocean
Dumping, 22 ENVTL. L. 913, at 928 (1992) (describing the influence of the CEQ's ocean
dumping report on adoption of ocean dumping legislation). See also William J. Chandler &
Hanna Gillelan, The History and Evolution of the NationalMarine SanctuariesAct, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,505, 10,521 (2004) ("With the release of the CEQ report on ocean dumping, momentum
for an ocean dumping law became unstoppable."). The MPRSA authorized the federal
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate the disposal of materials in the ocean by, among
other things, empowering EPA to permit offshore disposal in certain narrow instances. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1411-1421 (2000). For a time, EPA typically prohibited offshore disposal when
confronted with scientific uncertainty over whether the implementation of a particular proposal
would adversely impact the marine environment. But its exercise of its permitting authority
under the Ocean Dumping Act was not as prohibitive as some would have preferred, leading to
challenges to EPA's approval practice and occasional litigation.
90. London Dumping Convention, supra note 63, art. III(1)(a) (prohibiting dumping); Id.
art. III(1)(b) (allowing alternative uses).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1402(f).
92. When a storm mangled an offshore rig, the government allowed the dumping of that
platform in place as an emergency exception to the removal rule. See Bill Finch & Ben Raines,
Offshore Platform StandardsGet a Tough Drilling, Wind-Design Criteriaare Under Question,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 2, 2005, at C7; Steve Quinn, Rita Ravages Oil Production in the
Gulf, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 2005, at C3. Heather Timmons & Vikas Bajaj, BP Details Its
Damages From Hurricanes,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at C5; Heather Timmons, BP Estimates
Damage by Hurricanesat $700 Million, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 5, 2005, at 15.
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Therefore, the United States has pursued a fairly restrictive
approach to ocean dumping in its domestic law. With respect to the
disposal of platforms at sea, the United States has committed to the
policy that oil platforms cannot be merely dumped in the ocean. They
to artificial reefs under specific
must either be removed or converted
93
law.
state
and
guidelines of federal
The current legal approach emerged despite recommendations by
government consultants to allow some dumping of platforms on the
OCS. 94 Recognizing that the cost of decommissioning is an important
business consideration that affects offshore drilling, in 1984 the DOI
requested that the Marine Board of the National Research Council study
and provide recommendations regarding the policy on removal of
95
The Marine Board committee discussed the
offshore platforms.
possibility of EPA-established ocean dumpsites for platforms and
government assumption of liability and responsibility for some
abandoned platforms. The committee recognized that "[slome would
view this policy as overly generous to the oil industry. Nevertheless, the
committee considers it difficult to justify a government requirement for
sums of private monies where marginal public
expenditure of very large
96
benefit would result."
Although the federal government ultimately rejected the National
Research Council's idea of siting and making available "ocean
dumpsites" for the purpose of disposing platforms offshore, these
recommendations illustrate that the cost of decommissioning is a major
component in the development of removal policy. The oil industry was
successful in getting policymakers to focus on cost considerations and
of these issues
liability relief and has continued to maintain the centrality
97
generally.
platforms
of
in discussions on alternative uses
Beyond the exception for artificial reefs, the conversion of rigs to
other "new uses" has a very good chance of being approved in the future.
A bill introduced by then Louisiana Representative, now Senator David
Vitter, the Rigs to Reef Act of 2003, sought to amend the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act to encourage not only more conversions of
platforms to artificial reefs, but also to other uses such as observation
93. McLaughlin, supra note 46, at 263-64.
94. The federal government rejected the advice of policy consultants recommending that
some ocean dumping of platforms be used in context of overall platform disposition policy.
COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 3 (recommending that the EPA designate a number
of ocean dumpsites for platforms). See McLaughlin, supra note 46, at 261 (noting removal
requirement stayed in place in domestic law despite influential report by the Commission on
Disposition of Offshore Platforms recommending some ocean dumping of platforms).
95.

See COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2.

96. See id. at 2.
97. See Rigs to Reefs Act of 2003, H.R. 2654, 108th Cong. (2003) (unenacted) (focusing
further on liability relief and tax breaks to oil companies who donate platforms).
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centers and aquaculture facilities. 98 Although this bill did not pass
through Congress, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a provision
authorizing alternate uses of existing structures and facilities previously
permitted on the OCS for energy-related uses. 99 Furthermore, some
experimental aquaculture projects using rigs have already begun. 1° ° The
current presidential administration supports such measures, as do
commercial interests. In response to the recommendations of the Ocean
Commission, the White House released the "U.S. Ocean Action Plan"
supporting the grant of new authority to the DOI "to permit OCS
facilities to be converted to other approved uses." 101
It is against the larger backdrop of competing oil dependence and
environmental concern that the United States developed its platform
removal policy. Traditionally, the United States has tried to encourage
offshore oil development and bring domestic supplies to the market at
the lowest price possible. 102 However, ocean dumping is strictly regulated
based on concern about degrading the ocean environment. 103 Now,
despite influential reports calling for restoration of ocean ecosystems,
further proposals for ever more "productive" uses of the ocean are
entering the public debate. ° 4 These competing objectives complicate the
98. Id.
99. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 388(a), 119 Stat. 594, 744-47 (2005) (to be codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1337(p)).
100. Experiments with operating rigs acting as aquaculture pens have begun in California.
See, e.g., HUBBS-SEAWORLD RESEARCH INST., THE GRACE MARICULTURE
PROJECT:

PROJECT DESCRIPTION, available at http://gracemaricultureproject.org/downloads/
GMPBrochure.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). See also Cheryl Lyn Dybas, Marine Life
Complicates Removal of Old Oil Rigs, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 11,2005, at AlO.
101. U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 24 (2004) [hereinafter BUSH RESPONSE].
102. Analyzing conflicting international treaty requirements on platform removal, Professor
McDade noted that "[a]s traditional advocates for the processes of change in international law,
nations such as the United Kingdom and the United States have to tread a cautious path
between maximum utilization of energy resources and the lowest possible expenditure
of
taxpayers' funds towards that unitisation." Paul V. McDade, The Removal of Offshore
Installationsand Conflicting Treaty Obligationsas a Result of the Emergence of the New Law of
the Sea: A Case Study, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 653 (1987).
103. The MPRSA authorizes the EPA to issue permits for the disposal of materials into the
ocean. The permitting process considers alternatives to ocean disposal as well as the
environmental impact of proposed dumping projects. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1421 (2000).
Sections 1412(a) and 1413(b) involve issues of environmental degradation.
104. Building on the publicly funded Ocean Commission Report, the non-governmental
Pew Oceans Commission conducted an extensive study also concluding that the health of the
oceans is precarious. PEW REPORT, supra note 53; OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20.
Notwithstanding, the current administration has identified as a clear objective: "making our
oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes cleaner, healthier, and more productive." BUSH RESPONSE,
supra note 101, at 3. The first two goals have yet to be aggressively pursued, but the last-ocean
production -has seen significant growth. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, The Other Side
of
SustainableAquaculture: MaricultureandNonpoint Source Pollution,9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
163 (2002) (arguing that United States must address ocean water quality and land-based
pollution to promote successful mariculture industry).
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issue of platform removal, both in domestic law and in international
negotiations. In the United States, the relaxation of the complete removal
rule set the stage for national artificial reef legislation intended to
distinguish rig-to-reef projects from prohibited ocean dumping.
C.

The Rig-to-Reef Alternative

In contrast to removing platforms as part of decommissioning, rig-toreef conversions are projects intended to relieve some of the financial
burden of decommissioning by allowing oil companies to leave platforms
in the ocean if states agree to accept title and liability for the platform
05
materials as artificial reefs. Rig-to-reef projects avoid some of the most
costly decommissioning measures such as transportation, onshore
1°6
In turn, states use these
dismantling, and payment of disposal fees.
the platform jacket-a
is
it
Typically
reefs.
projects to create artificial
is left in the
floor-that
steel support structure that is affixed to the ocean
ocean to act as an artificial reef. Artificial reefs in the United States have
been used primarily for recreational fishing, although a few projects have
been used for mitigating damage to ocean areas and estuaries impacted
7
by construction and industrial projects.1
105. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 91. Oil companies are profit-maximizing
entities focused on exploration and extraction; apart from their donations to rigs-to-reef projects,
they are not in the business of constructing fisheries habitat. Thus, companies choose to remove
platforms rather than seek conversion when it is less expensive to do so. This reality prompted a
Louisiana Congressman, Representative David Vitter, to propose The Rigs to Reefs Act of
2003, which if passed would have provided tax incentives to donating companies in addition to
removal and liability relief. See H.R. 2654, 108th Cong. (2003).
106. Since decommissioning includes plugging wells and the conversion to an artificial reef
also includes some measure of cleaning, the significant savings comes from the avoided cost of
transportation and onshore recycling or disposal fees. The particular disposition scenario
implicates different costs. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 53-57 (discussing various costs
of decommissioning options).
107. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 17. Artificial reef
planners voice concern about using artificial reefs as mitigation rather than as enhancement for
fishing access. COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4, at xi. One
mitigation project that bears noting is occurring in response to the loss of kelp habitat offshore
California. The California Coastal Commission required that Southern California Edison build
artificial reefs to mitigate damage to natural kelp beds caused by the nuclear power generating
plant at San Onofre. The two-phase project includes a small-scale pilot experiment and the
second larger-scale mitigation construction project. Paul Sisson, Scientists: Artificial Reef Could
Make Amends for San Onofre 'sEnvironmental Damage, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, June 27, 2005.
The final report from the experimental phase of the project suggests the experiment efforts will
ON
be worthwhile. See DAN REED ET AL., UNIV. OF CALIF., SANTA BARBARA, FINAL REPORT
THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PHASE OF THE SONGS

ARTIFICIAL REEF MITIGATION PROJECT (Cal. Coastal Comm'n, Aug. 2005). According to the
authors,
Results from the five-year experimental phase of the artificial reef mitigation project
were quite promising in that all six artificial reef designs and all seven locations (i.e.
blocks) tested showed a near equally high tendency to meet the performance
standards established for the mitigation reef. We conclude from these findings that a
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Logistically, an artificial reef can be made from a platform jacket in
several ways: cutting off the platform top and leaving the jacket in place;
toppling the jacket in place; or removing the jacket and moving it to
another location where it is secured to the ocean floor. 108 When the first
two of these options are used following production in federally regulated
areas (i.e., beyond the three-mile mark), the platforms remain in federally
controlled OCS areas, but are managed by state officials. 109 When the
platform is moved, it may be moved to other areas of the federal OCS or
brought closer to shore in state waters. 110 In either event, the converted
platform ultimately attracts fish, which in turn provides a "hot spot" for
fishermen or divers."' According to rig-to-reef proponents, each method
of artificial reef creation has unique fisheries benefits. 112
Artificial reef popularity has increased as fisheries managers place
restrictions on fishing in the hope of rebuilding the health of devastated
fisheries. 113 Notwithstanding optimism for this unique waste disposal
solution, artificial reefs have not contributed measurably to rebuilding
overfished domestic fisheries 14 but instead have been used mostly as
recreational fishing and diving attractions.11 5 The irresolute approach of
low relief concrete rubble or quarry rock reef constructed off the coast of San
Clemente, CA has a good chance of providing adequate in-kind compensation for the
loss of kelp forest biota caused by the operation of SONGS Units 2 & 3.
Id. at 7. In Europe, artificial reefs have been used much more extensively to assist with
conservation objectives rather than recreational opportunities. Antony Jensen, ArtificialReefs of
Europe: Perspectiveand Future,59 ICES J. MARINE SCI. S3 (Oct. 2002).
108.

COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 49-51.

109. See Oil and Gas Lease Sale 116, Final Notice of Sale, 62 Fed. Reg. 4789, 4794 (Jan. 31,
1997); Oil and Gas Lease Sale 168, Final Notice of Sale, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,863, 39,869 (July 24,
1997) (referring to the fact that an adjacent state, Texas, had zoned proposed lease area for
future artificial reef development).
110. The Federal Government has jurisdiction from three to 200 miles; the coastal states
have jurisdiction from the shore out to the three-mile mark. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
111. Denny, supra note 6 (noting that fishermen in the Gulf concentrate their fishing efforts
around platforms); Tom Behrens, Sunken Treasure;Artificial Reef Makes SnapperAccessible to
Small Boat Owners,HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2002, This Week, at 11 (noting that rigs are
"staples of red snapper anglers" in Texas). See also Mistretta, supra note 9
(reporting fishermen
assertions that a trip out to a rig guarantees a catch); MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 79
(noting frequent use of platforms for fishing).
112. Toppling the structure limits the reef to benthic use, whereas cropping the top and
leaving the jacket in place allows for habitat at different depths and can allow the existing fish
populations to remain relatively undisturbed. These options also have varying impacts on
navigation. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 49-51 (discussing "the leave-in-place
option," "the partial removal options," "the topple-in-place-option," and "the emplace
elsewhere option").
113. Behrens, supra note 111.
114. Fisheries managers have not targeted artificial reefs as a tool to improve the recovery
of certain fish stocks. Research is just beginning to review the question of whether reefs could
provide assistance to fisheries as a recovery tool.
115. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 13; COASTAL
ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4, at 12, 16; MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at
73.
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the United States towards the issue of removal as discussed above leads
many citizens, some environmentalists, and certain policymakers as
discussed more fully below, to conclude such projects are much more
about subsidizing oil production than improving fisheries. These critics
would reject these projects as ocean garbage dumping 116rather than
While the
approve them as materials that enhance marine resources.
legal definition of ocean dumping clearly does not include the
establishment of an artificial reef for recreational use, without
fisheries
demonstrated success of artificial reefs to improve and enhance
117
difference.
a
without
this legal approach creates a distinction
TURNING PLATFORMS INTO REEFS:
II.
ARTIFICIAL REEF LEGISLATION AND GULF STATE PROGRAMS

This section reviews the primary federal and state laws that govern
artificial reef development and rig-to-reef conversions. Congress crafted
the National Fishing Enhancement Act to facilitate rig-to-reef
conversions and it was adopted by many states in the Gulf of Mexico.

This law is not the equivalent of a comprehensive federal program for
118 Rather,
the Act has numerous
artificial reef development.
shortcomings, and by extension the state artificial reef programs provide
a poorly performing system of pseudo-experimentation that lacks
adequate safeguards for addressing long-term environmental concerns.

or
116. The Ocean Conservancy typically opposes the use of artificial reefs for fishing
human
for
mitigate
to
reefs
for
potential
the
considering
approach
cautious
a
seeks
but
tourism,
damaged habitat. See Ocean Conservancy: Artificial Reefs, http://www.oceanconservancy.org/
Ocean
site/PageServer?pagename=issues-artificialreefs (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Also, the
on overConservancy has noted the likelihood that artificial reefs could have a negative effect
opposed
fished species. See Langenhenning, supra note 6. The most vocal environmental NGO
to alternative offshore disposal methods is Greenpeace. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN
& DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 742-43

Spar). The
[hereinafter HUNTER ET AL.] (discussing Greenpeace activism over dumping of Brent
Osterhoudt,
Sarah
See
projects.
such
of
skeptical
also
is
Council
Defense
Resources
Natural
Reefer Madness, NRDC ONEARTH, Winter 2002, available at http://www.nrdc.orgl
virtually
onearth/02win/briefings.asp ("[T]he actual ecological effects of artificial reefs are
riglegalize
to
attempt
recent
most
the
rejected
Davis
unstudied and unknown...."). Governor
Gray
to-reef conversions in California. S.B. 1, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2000) (vetoed by Governor
SANTA
Davis, Oct. 13, 2001). See also Rigs to Reefs; Who Benefits - Oil Companiesor Rockfish?,
note 47.
BARBARA INDEP., Dec. 9,2004, at 19. But see PULSIPHER & DANIEL, supra

117. See COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 51 (commenting that, for the emplace
public use
elsewhere option, "To the extent that obsolete structures are poorly sited as reefs and
dumping.").
ocean
than
more
little
often
is
option
this
that
benefits are limited, it can be argued
118. McGlaughlin suggests that a strictly case-by-case approach rather than a coordinated
of
permitting procedure for rig-to-reef development will be continued based on the concerns
commercial
user groups, notably the Department of Defense, U.S. Coast Guard, and some
fishing interests. McLaughlin, supranote 46, at 262.
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The NationalFishing Enhancement Act of 1984

The National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984 (NFEA) was
adopted without much fanfare. As its very name announces, this act was
designed to promote fishing. Acknowledging that "overfishing and the
degradation of vital fishery resource habitats have caused a reduction in
the abundance and diversity of United States fishery resources...," 119
Congress adopted NFEA "to promote and facilitate responsible and
effective efforts to establish artificial reefs,"'1 20 and to "enhanc[e] fishery
resources and commercial and recreational fishing opportunities.' 121
By the time the NFEA was enacted-and despite wide disagreement
over their utility and hazards-artificial reefs had gained great popularity
in many coastal areas for enhancing recreational fishing and diving
opportunities.1 22 Artificial reefs had been made from discarded refuse of
virtually every sort- discarded tires, cars, scrap vessels, and bridge and
highway rubble. t 23 Indeed, artificial reef guidelines in the United States
have developed in large part to prevent waste disposal in the guise of
artificial reef construction. A number of these earlier artificial reef
projects did cause damage to natural habitat, but nearly all had the effect
of attracting fish to near-shore areas. Adoption of NFEA recognized: "if
you build it, they will come. 1 24
As these early efforts demonstrated, almost any item placed in the
ocean can attract fish and operating rigs were no exception. Many
fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico relied on operating platforms to attract
populations of fish in convenient near-shore areas, and they feared that
the removal of platforms would reduce fishing opportunities. 125 The
proliferation of artificial reefs generally and the attractiveness of
platforms to fish popularized the idea that oil rigs could be converted into
artificial reefs. 126 Proponents of rig-to-reef conversions in the Gulf of
Mexico, particularly recreational fishermen, noted that "restrictions on
fishing" and "increasing demands on marine fish" made rigs-to-reefs a
win-win situation for fishing interests and oil companies. 127 In their view,
rig-to-reef projects were sure to further the goal of "concentrat[ing]
119. 33 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) (2000).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (2000).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 2105(1) (2000).
122. James D. Murray, A Policy and Management Assessment of U.S. Artificial
Reef
Programs,55 BULL. MARINE SCI. 960 (1994) (noting that interest in artificial reefs
has increased,
and providing several recommendations for increased review of artificial reef sites
and improved
management practices).
123. Id. at 963 ("[A]lmost every conceivable solid waste item has been used in artificial
reef
construction.").
124. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
125. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 73.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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128
Indeed, despite the growing
marine life and enhanc[ing] fishing."
29
that marine fisheries were seriously taxed by overuse, the
evidence
NFEA was designed to promote enhanced access and utilization of
fisheries. 13 0
The NFEA codified an exception to the rule requiring the removal
131
The NFEA defines an artificial reef
of platforms for "artificial reefs.'
in waters, "for the purpose of
placed
or
as a structure that is constructed
enhancing fishery resources and commercial and recreational fishing
opportunities.' ' 132 Accordingly, the purpose rather than the effect of
habitat enhancement legally defines an artificial reef and distinguishes it
from ocean dumping. This definitional approach-purpose versus
effect-could be reasonable from a legislative point of view, since any
given artificial reef might not actually provide an enhancement of
fisheries resources. 133 Even though the oil rig was not originally placed on
the seafloor for the purpose of enhancing fishery resources, this exception
allows a conceptual re-birth into an artificial reef once an oil company
transfers title to the state.

1. Puntingon Coordinationand Vision: A NationalArtificial Reef
Plan?
The NFEA divided responsibility for regulating the development
and monitoring of artificial reefs between the Secretary of Commerce,
charged with overseeing agencies that regulate fisheries, and the Army
Corps of Engineers, which has permitting power for fixed OCS
structures. 134 The federal government has no active role in artificial reef
construction on a national level, nor are reef building activities

128. Id.
129. See supranotes 53-60 and accompanying text.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000). Congress enumerated several goals for artificial reefs
constructed pursuant to NFEA. Chief among these are to "(1) enhance fishery resources to the
maximum extent practicable; [and] (2) facilitate access and utilization by United States
recreational and commercial fishermen ... " Id.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 2105(1) (2000).
133. This was the comment of staff who reviewed the proposed California Rigs to Reefs Act
S.B. 1. Noting it was not reasonable to ask the California Department of Fish and Game to
determine whether an artificial reef provided a net environmental benefit compared to the
removal of the platform, staff suggested evaluating whether the proposed artificial reef did not

pose a significant harm to the marine environment. See infra V.B.2 (California's Skepticism of
rigs-to-reefs).

134.

Five federal entities have varying degrees of involvement in rig-to-reef conversions: the

Department of Interior (DOI), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). See NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 4-9
(discussing the roles of federal agencies in artificial reef permitting, planning, and construction).

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 32:863

coordinated nationally. t35 Instead, the NFEA directed the drafting of a
National Artificial Reef Plan (NARP) to guide states to develop their
own comprehensive artificial reef programs. 36
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in
the Department of Commerce, produced the NARP in 1985 and
published a draft revision thereto in 2002.137 The 1985 NARP noted
serious deficiencies in our knowledge of how to construct and manage
artificial reefs to enhance fishery resources. 138 The knowledge gap was
also the subject of a comprehensive review of current science and
literature on artificial reefs published by fisheries scientists in the Bulletin
of Marine Science shortly after the adoption of the NFEA. 139 The authors
of this review noted that "[d]espite considerable enthusiasm by various
government agencies, private organizations and individuals, relatively
little is known about the biology and ecology of artificial reefs."' 40 The
authors pointed out that government agencies and others were spending
significant funds to construct artificial reefs "despite the general lack of
fundamental knowledge concerning optimum design criteria, location,
and size of reefs.' 141 Echoing these concerns, the 1985 NARP recognized
that "[i]mproperly planned, constructed, or managed reefs can be
ineffective, interfere with other activities (e.g., trawling) or damage

natural habitats and benefits may not be realized.' ' 42
To assure high quality construction of artificial reefs in the future,
the NARP evaluates proposed materials by focusing on four factors:
function, compatibility, durability and stability, and availability. 43

135. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 2.
136. 33 U.S.C § 2103.
137. The NARP is in the form of a technical memorandum, published by NOAA, providing
guidance on artificial reef building. Several agencies also contributed to the contents, including
the National Marines Fisheries Service and EPA. The executive summary of the NARP explains
that its three major functions are to provide guidance to individuals, organizations and
government agencies on the technical aspects of reef construction and management, based on
the best available scientific information. Also, the NARP is to serve as a guide to state and
federal agencies who permit and manage artificial reef to ensure national standards and
objectives of the NFEA are achieved. Finally, the NARP seeks to encourage comprehensive
planning of artificial reefs with emphasis on the consideration of local conditions. To this end,
the NARP noted that local reef siting plans were being developed (as of September 1985) and
the NARP may encourage additional planning in other areas of the country interested in
artificial reef construction. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at vi. See
also NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12.
138. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 36-38 (discussing priority
research needs).
139. James A. Bohnsack & David L. Sutherland, Artificial Reef Research: A Review with
RecommendationsforFuturePriorities,37 BULL. MARINE SCI. 11 (1985).
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id.
142. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 2.
143. Id. at 14.
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Platform jackets score high in each of these areas. 144 According to
artificial reef builders, platform jackets are superior to some materials
because of their durability and the minimal likelihood for drift or
NARP, the
movement once placed.1 45 According to the initial
"advantages of petroleum structures as reef material derive from their
diverse locations and water depths, large numbers, inherent design,
modification flexibility, longevity, and stability." 146 The recently updated
NARP expresses optimism about the development of state experience
building artificial reefs.
2.

Exception to the Platform Removal Requirement

After Congress enacted the NFEA, the MMS promulgated
regulations revising its policy (and setting aside relevant lease
148
The regional
obligations 147) requiring the removal of all oil platforms.
removal or
structure
partial
supervisor of the MMS may now approve
149
provided the following
toppling in place for a rig-to-reef conversion,
requirements are met: (1) the structure becomes part of a state artificial
reef program; (2) the responsible state obtains a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers; and (3) the state accepts title and liability for the
structure. 150 NFEA does not, however, provide any funding for state
151
artificial reef programs.

144. Quality reef construction materials can be extremely expensive. Unlike countries such
as Japan, which spend significant amounts to construct artificial reefs, in the United States, states
rely on the donation of materials to complete artificial reef construction projects. The main
source of artificial reef construction materials in the U.S. is recycled materials, although the
market for pre-fabricated reef materials is growing. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985,
supra note 44, at 1 (contrasting the United States approach with that of Japan).
145. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 17.
146. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 17. The initial NARP noted
that, at the time of its publication in 1985, there were "about 4,000 active offshore gas and oil
structures in place with most serving as de facto reefs." Id.
147. See sources cited supranote 86.
148. 51 Fed. Reg. 7584-02 (Mar. 6, 1986) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
149. 30 C.F.R § 250.1730 (2005).
150. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1730(a). In 2002, the MMS reorganized decommissioning regulations
and adopted provisions which provide the MMS Regional Supervisor the authority to approve
an alternate removal depth of a platform (other than fifteen feet below the mudline) if at least
one of the following is satisfied: (1) the structure will not be an obstruction to other users of the
seafloor or area and certain information is submitted to show that erosional processes are not
expected to expose the obstructions; or (2) divers are required and the seafloor sediment
stability poses safety risks; or (3) the water depth is greater than 2,624 feet. 30 C.F.R. § 250.1728
(2005). In the preamble to the final rule, MMS asserted that this section is not intended to permit
the MMS to allow portions of platforms to be abandoned in place. Instead it is to allow some
measure of abandonment when structures do not pose a hazard to other ocean users or
navigation. It also creates special exceptions for platforms in deeper waters (depth of over 2,624)
and where the safety of personnel (divers) needed to conduct removal obligations are of
paramount concern. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental
Shelf-Decommissioning Activities; Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,398 (May 17, 2002) (codified at
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This exception shifts the decision to leave a platform on the OCS to
a coastal state that agrees to incorporate the platform into its artificial
reef program. The exception is unique in that states may be managing
these structures in federal waters beyond the three-mile mark that legally
defines state from federal jurisdiction offshore.
NFEA requires that states take on title to the platform and liability
for platforms converted to reefs. 15 2 The NARP compares the decision a
state makes to assume a permit for reef construction to the decision it
makes to construct a public park. 153 Strict adherence to all permit
requirements will immunize reef managers, typically employees of state
fish and game departments, from liability pursuant to section 205 of
NFEA. 154 However, under other circumstances an artificial reef
155
manager's liability is unclear.
States are shielded from liability for damage that arises in connection
with compliance with the terms and conditions of an artificial reef permit.
However, there are at least two instances where a state may be subject to
liability despite this permit shield. First, the permit shield does not apply
where liability arises from the violation of one or more permit conditions.
Second, the permit shield does not extend to occurrences that are beyond
the scope of permit requirements. Put simply, the permit shield is only as
56
broad as the permit itself.'
As a practical matter, the likelihood of state liability seems rather.
remote. The permitting process contains measures that help ensure the
structural integrity and stability of proposed artificial reefs. In addition,
artificial reefs are required to be shown on navigation charts, marked
with buoys, and otherwise satisfy navigability requirements. NOAA's
Artificial Reef Plan Revision suggests that a properly sited and marked
artificial reef poses little possibility for liability.

30 C.F.R. pts. 250 and 256). As MMS pointed out in response to comments, it does not have
authority to allow ocean-disposal of platforms. Instead, the EPA would have to issue an oceandumping permit pursuant to the MPRSA. Id. at 35,401.
151. Most funding is provided by state appropriations, federal aid for sportsfishing
restoration and platform donors. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 81.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 2104 (2000).
153. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 39.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(1).
155. Without the benefit of a federal statute relieving liability, the state actors might call
upon state sovereign immunity doctrines and state assumption of the risk law to defend suits
based on personal injury or property damage.
156. Under the National Fishing Enhancement Act, there is no liability for acts required
under the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 2104(c)(1). However, the Act provides for potential liability in any
other non-permit related actions: "A person to whom a permit is issued in accordance with
subsection (a) of this section and any insurer of that person shall be liable, to the extent
determined under applicable law, for damages to which [§ 2104(c)(1)] does not apply." 33 U.S.C.
§ 2104(c)(1).
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The issue of state liability for artificial reefs has had no exploration
in the courts. Presumably, a state would have at its disposal a number of
defenses to a suit for damages arising from property or personal injuries
under tort theories. The analogy to liability for public parks is apt, and
fishermen and divers using recreational reefs are likely to face
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence doctrines. If a thirdparty could make a prima facie case for nuisance, trespass, or negligence,
the state may still be able to avoid liability based on the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, 15 7 or as is more common today, immunity
statutes adopted by state legislatures or recreational use statutes.
The platform donator, on the other hand, is shielded from liability
after it has transferred title to the platform if the NARP standards are
met and materials are not "otherwise defective at the time title is
' '158
transferred.
NFEA was clearly intended to clarify title to abandoned platforms,
shift liability to coastal states, and preserve federal interests in continued
mineral extraction and navigation. Absent from these efforts is any longterm vision for the use of artificial reefs on the OCS or a federal role in
ensuring habitat enhancement is obtained by these projects. Put simply,
the NFEA facilitates rig-to-reef projects for catching fish. This is one of
NFEA's key failings. To the extent NFEA presumes you can add more
and more fishermen landing catch, more frequent fishing trips, and still
have an enhanced fisheries resource in the form of more fish in the sea,
one wonders what miracle could possibly make this regime work in the
long-term. 59 Artificial reef science is far from illustrating that artificial
reefs are an improvement over existing natural habitat for the directed
purpose of increasing the health and abundance of ocean fisheries, and
thus should not be viewed as a panacea for overfishing. 6° There is no
157.

FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES,

JR. & OSCAR S.

GRAY, Liability of

Governmental Units, 5 THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 (2d ed. 1986).
158. 33 U.S.C. § 2104(4) (2000). Relief from liability is logical to the extent the donor is no
longer in control of materials that are left in the ocean and managed by state entities. Some see
this relief of liability as overly generous to oil companies. However, it would be illogical to
maintain private liability for a material that a state is putting to public use.
159.

Michael Neubert, Can We Catch More Fish and Still Preserve the Stock?, 43 OCEANUS

1 (Jan. 19, 2005) (examining the increasing use of Marine Protected Areas to conserve fish and
optimize fisheries yield), http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/dfino/2005/4/v43n2-neubert-2395.pdf.
Using mathematical analysis, the author determined that marine reserves, areas where no fishing
is allowed, must be included to achieve the fishing strategy that provides maximum yield. "In
other words, fishermen actually catch fewer fish than when there are no areas closed to fishing."
Id. at 3.
160. Jeffrey J. Polovina, Artificial Reefs: Nothing More than Benthic Fish Aggregators,30
CAL. COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 37, 37 (1989) (reporting

that despite billions in investments and volume of artificial reef deployment, between 1976-87
no measurable increase in coastal fishing landings occurred in Japanese fisheries). See also Dr.
Stanislav Patin, Decommissioning, Abandonment and Removal of Obsolete Offshore
Installations, http://www.rigzone.com/news/insight/insight-pf.asp?i-id=112 (last visited Dec. 1,
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evidence that an increase in the use of artificial reefs will produce
161
sufficient fish to keep up with the rising demand of recreational fishing.
Given the existing scientific understanding of the function of artificial
reefs in marine ecosystems, NFEA expresses a policy decision that
providing recreational opportunities outweighs the potential hazards of
expanding the use of artificial reefs.
3.

The Deceptive Comfort of the "Best Scientific Information Available"

Like many modern environmental statutes, the NFEA requires that
the "best scientific information available" apply to the siting,
construction, monitoring, and management of artificial reefs. 162 But
NFEA does not fund artificial reef research or require mandatory
monitoring in state programs that might lead to increased scientific
information about artificial reefs. 163 Like the original NARP, the draft
Artificial Reef Plan Revision of 2002 notes that several areas of artificial
reef research are still under-explored. 164 "While information on artificial
reefs has increased, resource managers still require more and better
fishery science and information to enable artificial reef programs to have
maximum sustained beneficial results at lowest costs, and to avoid
situations where reefs are found to be detrimental to resources or
users."1 65 The specific areas identified by a survey of reef managers
include, among other things: understanding reef community ecology, reef

2005). Patin discusses the secondary use of offshore platforms. He notes that rig-to-reefs was
popular in the Gulf of Mexico because of the association between rigs and fish landings.
However, further analyses of the fishing situation in the Gulf of Mexico showed that
the growth of the fish catch in this case was connected not with increasing the total
stock and abundance of commercial species but with their redistribution due to the
reef effect of the platforms. A critical point here was the use of static gear methods of
fishing (e.g., lines and hooks) instead of trawl gears.
Id. Thus, the scientific uncertainty about the effects of rigs on fish populations continues to play
an important role in the expansion and administration of rig-to-reef programs, particularly
where overfishing may still be occurring.
161. See infra Part III.A.
162. 33 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000).
163. Some funding for research on the effects of artificial reefs has been offered through the
NMFS Cooperative Research Program (CRP) Grant Program. For example, a solicitation for
applications to further research on recreational and charter fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico and
Atlantic coast noted that "research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of artificial reefs, what
can artificial reefs do for the fishing community, and estimate associated impacts." Financial
Assistance for Research and Development Projects in the Gulf of Mexico and off the U.S. South
Atlantic Coastal States; Cooperative Research Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,235, 77,237 (Dec. 17,
2002). The solicitation also noted that better information was needed on the catch and effort
from recreational fishermen.
164. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 40.
165. Id.
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harvest analysis,
population life histories, bioengineering and design,
166
community production, and reef population dynamics.

The bottom line is that fundamental knowledge about what artificial
reefs do is still missing, while funding for artificial reef management
continues to be a problem. Better artificial reef science would
substantially increase potential benefits to the environment from artificial
reefs and avoid future harm from ill-designed or poorly managed reefs.1 67
But the consequence of the current approach is that-even two decades
later-the "best scientific information available" requirement in the
context of rigs-to-reefs is essentially a symbolic, cautionary statement
with little real-world meaning. 168
B.

Gulf State Rig-to-Reef Programs

Of all the coastal states, Louisiana has the most comprehensive and
well-developed statutory framework for addressing artificial reef
planning.1 69 In 1986, the legislature adopted the Louisiana Fishing
Enhancement Act. This legislation created the Louisiana Artificial Reef
Development Program and led to the creation of an Artificial Reef Plan
to implement the installation of artificial reefs. 170 Louisiana took these
steps because, among other reasons, the "loss of existing oil and gas
structures could lead to a reduction in current charter-boat operations, as
' 71
well as potential tourism and coastal development opportunities"'
166. Id. at 40-42 (also documenting other needs including estuarine applications,
socioeconomics information, and research on the potential uses for mitigation).
167. See id. at 40 (noting that more and better fisheries science is needed to improve success
of artificial reefs and prevent harms from artificial reefs). Marine science is far behind terrestrial
science, and it may be the case that we are unable to understand the complexity of the
relationship between marine habitat and marine life on a scale that would enable successful
artificial reef construction for fisheries enhancement. Furthermore, perfect scientific
understanding of artificial reefs still would not dictate their use. Competing ocean users would
still disagree over the extent of their use. See generallyMCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 13-14
n.6 (discussing limitations of scientific information to solve debate over the merits of the rigs-toreef option).
168. The phrase appears in many statutes that involve impacts on the environment, and its
definition has been left to debate in statutes of major importance such as the Endangered
Species Act and the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects and
Future of the EndangeredSpecies Act's Best Available Science Mandate,34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004);
Michael J. Brennan et al., SquarePegs and Round Holes: Application of the "Best Scientific Data
Available " Standardin the EndangeredSpecies Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 387 (2003).
169. Murray, supra note 122, at 961.
170. Louisiana Fishing Enhancement Act, 1986 La. Acts 100 § 1, codified as amended at LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:639(1)-(10) (West 2004); § 56:639.5(A) (creating the Louisiana Artificial
Reef Development Program to "promote, develop, maintain, monitor and enhance the artificial
reef potential" in the navigable waters of Louisiana, and the waters of the adjacent federal
exclusive economic zone).
171. CHARLES A. WILSON ET AL., LA. DEPT. OF WILDLIFE & FISHERIES TECHNICAL
BULLETIN NO. 41, LOUISIANA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN 5-6 (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter LOUISIANA
ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN].
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The Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan is the product of a public process
intended to establish guidelines and goals for Louisiana artificial reef
efforts. Many different interest groups participated in the public hearings;
as the plan notes, "[v]irtually all of the comments obtained supported the
concept of an artificial reef plan for Louisiana. Many interest groups felt
that a centrally coordinated state plan was critical to preventing artificial
reef development from deteriorating into haphazard ocean dumping off
the Louisiana coast. ' 172 Based on an assessment of participant
preferences for the siting of artificial reefs, the Louisiana Artificial Reef
Plan states that "most, if not all, artificial reefs will be placed in areas
1 73
where oil and gas structures and other obstructions now exist."'
Three components of the Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan-artificial
reef establishment, funding, and indemnity-warrant comment. Under
the Louisiana Artificial Reef Plan, artificial reefs must be established
174
pursuant to the NFEA guidelines and the permits required thereunder.
Similarly, consistent with the NFEA, artificial reef siting, construction,
maintenance, and monitoring must be implemented "based upon the best
scientific information available."'' 75 The responsible department is also
broadly directed to "[d]evelop additional technical information needed to
176
carry out the program."'
The Artificial Reef Plan called for the creation of an Artificial Reef
Development Fund. Noting that the NFEA did not provide funding to
offset state costs and ongoing maintenance obligations associated with
artificial reef programs, Louisiana indicated it would "depend upon oil
and gas companies donating a portion of their savings realized thorough
their participation in the program.' 1 77 An oil company is asked to donate
one-half of the avoided cost of removal to the fund, although this aspect
of the program is not codified.
Finally, various provisions of the Artificial Reef Plan and the
Louisiana Fishing Enhancement Act address liability issues. The state
and its agencies are absolved of liability under a permit shield for
activities required by state and federal permits, 178 and donors are also
shielded from damage claims if the donated materials meet applicable
federal guidelines. 179 Once title transfers from a donor oil company to the
172. Id. at 20.
173. Id. at 17.
174. Id.at 42.
175. § 56:639.4 (establishing standards for artificial reefs).
176. § 56:639.5(B)(1)(e).
177. LOUISIANA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN, supra note 171, at 20.
178. § 56:639.10(A) ("The department, the state of Louisiana and its agencies, and any
insurer of these groups shall not be liable for damages caused by activities required to be
undertaken under the terms and conditions of state and federal permits acquired for reef
development.").
179.
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state (in the case of an offshore rig), the donor company is contractually
indemnified as long as all NARP and Louisiana Artificial Reef
Development Program elements are met. 180
In 1989, Texas adopted a statutory scheme to facilitate artificial reef
construction. 181 Like Louisiana, Texas developed an Artificial Reef Plan
to implement its Artificial Reef Act. The Texas Department of Parks and
Wildlife reviews artificial reef proposals, and may grant a permit for
82
artificial reef establishment if the proposal complies with the NFEA.1
Texas has converted several rigs under its program, noting their
recreational value. In fact, according to the Department of Parks and
Wildlife, rig conversions are the "heart" of the Texas artificial reef
13
plan. 8
The Texas program is similar to the Louisiana program with respect
to establishment, funding, and liability. The Texas Artificial Reef Act
requires reefs to be "sited, constructed, maintained, monitored, and
the best scientific information
managed in a manner that.. .uses
available...." 184 Companies are asked to donate one-half of their savings
in exchange for relief from removal obligations. Title and liability is
transferred to the state, which also uses a permit shield approach to
insulate the state and its agents for activities undertaken pursuant to state
and federal permits for artificial reef development.1i 5
Other states in the Gulf also have artificial reef programs and,
though on a much smaller scale than Texas and Louisiana, have obtained
18 6
rigs to convert to artificial reefs for recreational fishing opportunities.
Florida's artificial reef program-adopted in 1982-is one of the more
active artificial reef programs in the Gulf and Atlantic states. 8 7 However,

Any person or company who has transferred title of artificial reef construction
materials to the state of Louisiana shall not be liable for damages arising from the use
of such materials in an artificial reef, if such materials meet applicable requirements of
the National Artificial Reef Plan published under Section 204 of the National Fishing
Enhancement Act, and United States Department of Interior regulations.
§ 56:639.10(B)
180. See State of Louisiana, Act of Donation, Article VII - Liability; 7.3 Title Passage of
Structure.
181. Act of May 1, 1989, ch. 47, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 47 (Vernon) (codified at TEX.
PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. §§ 89.001-89.061 (Vernon 2005)).

182. § 89.003.
183. Texas Parks & Wildlife, Artificial Reefs Enhance Fishery Resources Plus Fishing and
Diving Opportunities off Texas, http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/landwater/water/habitats/
artificialreef/artreef.phtml (last visited Nov. 15,2005).
184. § 89.023(6).
185. § 89.061.
186. Mississippi and Alabama also have artificial reef programs which are similar to the
NFEA. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-15-17 (2004); ALA. CODE § 9-12-150 (2004).
187. Jon Dodrill, Artificial Reef Program Summary Overview, Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission Meeting, Nov. 2000 (on file with author).
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only a few former offshore rigs are included in the program. 188
Furthermore, in contrast with Texas and Louisiana, Florida is unlikely to
continue using converted offshore oil rigs in its artificial reef program
because there are no operating rigs currently in Florida coastal waters or
in the adjacent federal waters.1 89 Thus, it is not economically feasible for
oil and gas companies to transport rig structures from surrounding areas
to offshore Florida in order to obtain financial relief from
decommissioning. This situation might change, of course, if offshore
drilling is pursued around Florida in the future.
At the time of its initial publication in 1985, the NARP recognized
that states were already actively legislating in this area, but it further
observed that "efforts are presently neither coordinated, nor universal
among State agencies."' 19 But this lack of coordination has begun to
change. As part of the process of amending the NARP, interstate
fisheries worked together to formulate and convey recommendations,
culminating in the Coastal Artificial Reef Planning Guide published in
1998.191 Recently, regional databases for artificial reef information have
been established to share experiences and improve communication
among artificial reef managers. And while not coordinated formally, the
existing artificial reef programs share many of the same elements since
they are all based on the NFEA.
To some extent the growth of these programs exacerbates the
problem posed by scientific uncertainty. Limited research and monitoring
dollars are stretched across increasing numbers of artificial reefs, which
may be creating unknown and as yet undetected problems. Increased
communications between states revealed that better fisheries research is
critical to artificial reef success, as is increased funding, specific goal188. Altogether, five artificial reef sites in Florida's coastal waters include ten platform
structures. Among them is one of the first offshore rigs to be converted to an artificial reef,
donated by Exxon in 1980 (even before any state program was in place). This and other offshore
rig conversions took place without any state or local government financial expenditures on costs
relating to preparation, transport, or installation, since the donor company paid for all these
expenses. A scientific survey of these sites yielded mixed results as to the numbers and diversity
of fish. The durability of the structures, on the other hand, proved to be quite good, as many had
withstood several hurricanes: Kate in 1985, Opal and Erin in 1995, and Andrew in 1992. Jon
Dodrill, Obsolete Oil and Gas Platforms in Florida's Artificial Reef Program, Div. of Marine
Fisheries, Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n (on file with author). Hurricanes hit
the Gulf coast annually, and oil rigs are designed to withstand the rough weather of tropical
storms and hurricanes. Indeed, platforms fare well as artificial reefs because of their stability. See
also Robert K. Turpin & Stephen A. Bortone, Pre- and Post-HurricaneAssessment of Artificial
Reefs: Evidence for Potential Use as Refugia in a Fishery Management Strategy, 59 ICES J.
MARINE SCI. S74 (Oct. 2002).

189. See MMS,
History
of Rigs-to-Reefs
(RTR)
Offshore
Florida,
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/egom/rigsreef.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). See
also Dodrill, supra note 188.
190.

191.

NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 4.
COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4, at ix.
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192 Most artificial reef
directed reef projects, and mandatory monitoring.
managers conceive of artificial reefs as fisheries management tools rather
193
than fish aggregating devices. Yet some artificial reef managers have
complained that the pressure exerted by fishing interests to create new
artificial reefs far exceeds their state program's capacity to monitor
94
previously constructed reefs. 1
As reflected in the review of various state legislative efforts, all states
share some degree of concern with regard to the environmental
consequences of artificial reefs. Yet, gulf state programs have not
generated necessary scientific data on artificial reefs, resulting in
continued public debate about the impact of artificial reefs on the
environment broadly as well as about rig-to-reef conversions specifically.
The current direction of increased coordination is necessary to generate
reliable information and create a program that ensures environmental
benefit from rig-to-reef construction projects. Artificial reef managers
must be supported with up-to-date information and the capacity to
evaluate the success of artificial reefs. Competition between the federal
government and states over OCS revenues and interest group pressure to
well-funded and publicly
expand these programs has left a void for
195
embraced research on artificial reef science.
Il1.

EXAMINING THE RIG-TO-REEF DEBATE

Notwithstanding the adoption of NFEA, there continues to be
196
significant concern about the use of oil platforms as artificial reefs.
Conservationists agitate for platform removal. One observer of this
debate has remarked that ocean activists and environmentalists have
adopted as a "core strategic objective" the complete removal of platforms
from the ocean following operations (known also as "onshore-only"
192. Id. at xi. ("Establishment of baseline evaluation and monitoring programs remains an
issue."). They suggested assessments of the physical attributes of the reef structures and to
establish objectives for building a reef. These steps "may require that such objectives be included
in permits." Id.
193. Id. Part of the reason for updating the NARP was to re-emphasize that artificial reefs
are fisheries management tools.
194. Murray, supra note 122 (stating everyone wanted a reef in their "backyard").
195. One suggestion for the hesitancy of environmentalists to support the use of artificial
reefs, beyond the state of existing scientific research is that the current body of knowledge has
been obtained primarily by oil industry funded research. See Seema Mehta, Artificial Reef
Shelter or Litter?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 4, 2000, at Al (noting that most of funding for
artificial reef science work has come from oil companies that concede they have a vested
interest). See generally Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory
Science: Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of PublicResearch to PrivateResearch, 30
AM. J. L. & MED. 119 (2004) (arguing for the need to infuse norms of sound science into
privately funded research that is relied on for health and environmental regulations).
196. McGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 90 ("Despite the NFEA, there remain a number of
issues and concerns associated with the use of rigs as artificial reefs.").
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disposition). 197 Yet, industry and recreationists continue to push for more
aggressive use of the exception to the removal rule. 198 The conflict is
compounded by a lack of federal direction for artificial reef programs,
whereby development of artificial reefs occurs state-by-state even on the
federally controlled OCS. MMS acknowledged in its 2000 Policy
Statement on Rigs-to-Reefs that the agency is uncertain whether to be
more conservative or more aggressive about securing offshore rigs for

artificial reefs. 199 Furthermore, since state programs depend on donations
for construction materials and funding, state planners note the limited
success likely from the standpoint of artificial reef managers who cannot
conduct long-term planning to implement state artificial reef plans. 2 o
With so many different interests and views on the proper approach to
environmental stewardship of the ocean resource, it is clear that rig-toreef policy must consider more than the enthusiasm of marine
recreationists and the waste disposal problem posed by costly platform
removal.
A.

The Ongoing Scientific Debate

Perhaps the most important aspect of the ongoing controversy is the
issue of whether artificial reefs benefit the environment. In October 2003,
diving crews sponsored by the industry group National Ocean Industries
Association and Coalition for Enhanced Marine Resources broadcast
vivid images of marine life living on and surrounding Platform Edith,
located off the coast of southern California. 201 Nuevo Energy Company
constructed Edith in 1983, after the federal government leased the site to
Nuevo to promote exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources. 202 As California
does not have a rig-to-reef
program, the future of this platform is in question.
197. PULSIPHER & DANIEL, supra note 47.
198. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 73-74.
199.

LES DAUTERIVE, RIGS-TO-REEFS POLICY, PROGRESS, AND PERSPECTIVE,
OCS MMS

REPORT 2000-073 at 5 (Minerals Mgmt. Serv. 2000) MMS poses several questions
to
stakeholders regarding rigs-to-reefs including, "Should we strive harder to retain and
use oil and
gas platforms ... ?" or "Should we be even more selective and conservative in encouraging
artificial reef development with obsolete platforms?" Id. at 5.
200. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF2002, supra note 12, at 23 ("[Ijt has
become
evident that a total reliance upon scrap materials may hinder the ability to reach
reef
development goals and objectives.").
201. The images can be accessed on the National Ocean Industry Association
(NOIA)
website. www.noia.org/rigs-reef.htm (follow "footage of Washington broadcast" hyperlink)
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2005). NOIA is a national trade association whose mission is "to secure
reliable
access and a favorable regulatory and economic environment for companies that develop
the
nation's valuable offshore resources in an environmentally responsible manner."
NOIA,
http://www.noia.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
202. MMS, Platforms Operated by Dos Cuadras Offshore LLC: Platform Edith, Lease
OCSP 0296, http://www.mms.gov/omm/pacific/offshore/platforms/doscuadrasplatform.htm
(last
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The existence of marine life on and around Platform Edith cannot be
denied. Less clear, however, is whether snapshot views like the October
2003 broadcast have any proper relevance in the scientific debate. The
proximity of marine life to offshore platforms is only the beginning of a
highly complex scientific puzzle. So complex, in fact, that even after years
of experimentation with artificial reefs, the environmental effects of rig
conversions (good and bad) remain beyond the reach of scientific
explanation. 2 3 Many critical scientific questions were not resolved before
1984 to facilitate rig-to-reef conversions, and
the NFEA was adopted in
2°4
today.
endure
they
in fact
In its most common form, the scientific debate involves competing
"production versus aggregation" theories.20 5 Production theory suggests
that artificial reefs are a source of fish whereas aggregation theory
proposes that fish are attracted to artificial reefs. Thus, proponents of
each theory have different interpretations of evidence that many fish and
other marine life are located at artificial reef sites. An increase in the
concentration of marine life in a particular location (such as an artificial
reef, for example) does not necessarily signal an increase in the overall
2°6
number of fish regionally (production). It is widely understood that fish
are good "associators," leading some skeptics to point out that by such
207
logic "[a] landfill can be considered essential habitat to seagulls...."
Fish gathered around dumped car batteries could hardly be considered
"habitat. ''2°8 In fact, through numerous scientific studies, experts have
concluded it is extremely difficult to evaluate whether leaving platforms

visited Nov. 16, 2005). According to MMS records, Edith is located 8.5 miles from the shore at a
water depth of 161 feet. It has produced 7,838,158 barrels cumulative oil production, and
5,665,629 mcf cumulative gas production as of March 2003. Id.
203. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 26 (discussing lack of complete information
about ig-to-reef ecology).
204. See id. at 73 (suggesting that this issue did not prevent adoption of programs in the Gulf
of Mexico as it has in California, but that the question is still important to state artificial reef
managers).
205. Id. at 90-91 (identifying the scientific uncertainty of the production versus aggregation
question as an unresolved issue of concern to state artificial reef managers).
206.

SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 32

(noting that even where a reef might have a strong local effect, "it is the regional effect that truly
matters from an ecological perspective"). Moving the focus from the immediate vicinity to a
regional approach changes the question of whether artificial reefs are effective, although the
authors note that depending on the objective for a certain artificial reef, attraction might be a
sufficient measure of success. The example they point to is where a reef is meant to provide
"non-consumptive recreational use." Id. at 20. This could be a spot for divers to view marine life
underwater.
207. Margot Higgens, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, Jan. 15, 2000, http://www.enn.com/
arch.html?id=12050 (quoting Eric Cardenas, a spokesperson for Santa Barbara's Environmental
Defense Council).
208. Mehta, supra note 195.
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in place affects regional stocks of fish either positively or negatively.20 9 As
discussed further in relation to fisheries management generally in Part
IV.C., it is particularly difficult to identify what areas of the ocean are
providing "habitat" (areas important to fish for different life stages,
propagation, growth, etc.) when seeking to protect areas of particularly
important habitat for marine species that are declining in numbers. 210
Some scientists dispute that artificial reefs serve as nurseries of the
sea, asserting that conditions at artificial reefs may be too harsh for nonadult fish.2 11 This calls into question whether the well-documented
attraction of large, mature fish to artificial reefs has a meaningful
ecological benefit. There is no scientific consensus about whether the
presence of significant numbers of adult species at a site necessarily
means that the site is an appropriate breeding ground to increase the
overall number of fish regionally.2 12
Focusing on production, according to some researchers,
oversimplifies a much more complex issue.2 13 Indeed, there is a serious
concern that artificial reefs may be harmful to fisheries and the
environment and hinder fish propagation. Artificial reefs may attract fish
away from more suitable natural habitat. 214 Whether or not some
artificial reefs are less productive than natural habitat has yet to be
determined. 215 Some species that might otherwise naturally exist in an
area may be displaced by artificial reefs that attract some species, but
209.

See SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at

32.
210. Under the Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
regional fisheries councils were charged with identifying areas of "essential fish habitat."
However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful to improve the health of fisheries, in part
because of the difficulty of identifying what areas of "habitat" are required throughout fish and
other marine species life-stages. See Kristen M. Fletcher & Sharonne E. O'Shea, Essential Fish
Habitat:Does Callingit EssentialMake it So?, 30 ENVTL. L. 51 (2000) (evaluating the relevance
of essential fisheries habitat (EFH) for fisheries management in the larger context).
211. D.R. Frumkes, The Status of the California Rigs-to-Reefs Programmeand the Need to
Limit Consumptive Fishing Activities, 59 ICES J. MARINE SCI. S272, S274 (Oct. 2002)
(describing one criticism of rigs-to-reefs as limiting the ability of juveniles recruited to rigs to
complete their life cycle in that habitat). But see Mark Helvey, Are Southern California Oil and
Gas PlatformsEssentialFish Habitat?,59 ICES J. MARINE SCI. S266, S270 (Oct. 2002).
212. MARK H. CARR ET AL., UNIV. OF CALIF., SANTA BARBARA, CONSEQUENCES OF
ALTERNATIVE DECOMMISSIONING OPTIONS TO REEF FISH ASSEMBLAGES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR DECOMMISSIONING POLICY, OCS STUDY MMS 2003-053 at 79 (again noting production
versus aggregation uncertainty and concern about the ability of reefs to assist at all stages of fish
life cycles).
213. SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 20
(noting that, as to the point of oversimplification, "For fishing enhancement, increased fish
production is not necessarily important, although it may be desirable.").
214. Id. at 32 (noting that the presence of organisms on an artificial structure does not
illustrate enhancement of regional stocks because the structure may have attracted such
organisms from more suitable habitats). See also Frumkes, supra note 211, at S274.
215. Helvey, supra note 211, at S270.
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repel others. 21 6 A related concern is that artificial reefs (including
converted rigs) could forever change the normal migration pattern of
certain fish, possibly luring them from more productive natural habitat to
artificial reefs, or causing other unforeseen problems in their lifecycles
2 7
Another frequently voiced
such as increasing natural mortality.
locations they simply
discrete
in
concern is that by concentrating fish
218 If artificial reefs do not create habitat that
become easier to catch.
may
produces a net gain in overall fish populations, their numbers 2 19
absent.
were
structures
such
if
than
quickly
more
actually be reduced
Further concerns about artificial reefs echo criticisms of
in
aquaculture.2 20 Aquaculture critics suggest there are unforeseen risks 22
1

fish propagation.
moving to a system of reliance on artificial reefs for

Aggregation of fish at artificial reefs can lead to increased contamination
from various sources-including onshore industrial operations and
agriculture, offshore waste disposal (including hazardous chemicals, drill
cuttings, and disintegrating structures associated with oil production

a
216. Frumkes, supra note 211, at S276. See also Polovina, supra note 160, at 38 (discussing
were
Japanese study from 1984 where some species were attracted to reefs whereas others
repelled, potentially having a negative effect).
217. See Lauren Gravitz, The Double-Edged Lure of Man-Made Reefs, CHRISTIAN SCI.
State
MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2000, at 16 (quoting Dr. Coleman, a fisheries ecologist at Florida
geologic
University, as pointing out "the migratory pathways of groupers have evolved over
must
time," and that artificial reefs may change these pathways). The NOAA notes that research
a
still be conducted to address the questions: "While resources are using artificial reefs, is there
man-made
"Do
and
habitats?"
other
to
compared
as
mortalities
difference in natural and fishing
reefs enhance prey fields and availability, and the growth rates of reef population cohorts?"
NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 41.
218. This is the most frequent concern voiced by opponents of artificial reefs. Polovina,
be
supra note 160, at 38 (concluding that artificial reefs can be excellent aggregators, but could
ultimately harmful "simply because they allow managers to delay making hard but necessary
decisions, such as imposing limits or reducing effort").
219. SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 20
have
("However, if the stock is fully exploited or overexploited, employing artificial reefs could
negative consequences for the stock unless the stock is enhanced through increased production
by the reefs."). See also Polovina, supra note 160, at 37 (emphasizing that in Japan, despite
billions in investments and volume of artificial reef deployment, between 1976-87 no measurable
increase in coastal fishing landings occurred).
220. See D. Douglas Hopkins, Rebecca J. Goldburg, & Andrea Marston, An Environmental
&
Critique of Government Regulations and Policies for Open Ocean Aquaculture,2 OCEAN
COASTAL L.J. 235, 237-40 (1997) (discussing some environmental concerns raised by the advent
8
of aquaculture in open ocean waters). See also Ronald J. Rychlak, Ocean Aquaculture,
ocean
of
health
improve
to
aquaculture
of
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 497 (1997) (discussing use
fisheries).
221. For an overview of the ecological issues associated with fish farming such as fishing
see
down the food chain, pollution, habitat modification, and introduction of non-native species,
Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effect of Aquaculture on World Fish Supplies, 405 NATURE 1017
(June 29, 2000). See also James H. Tidwell & Geoff L. Allan, Fish as Food: Aquaculture's
Contribution,2 EMBO REPORTS 958 (2001) (seeking to dispel many environmental concerns
associated with aquaculture).
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operations), 222 and even fish wastes-that becomes concentrated in their
immediate environment. 223 Such contamination has already occurred in
some aquaculture operations. 224
Artificial reefs, though touted as a fisheries management tool and
quite popular with hobby fishermen and divers, do not appear to have
improved the health of fisheries in American coastal waters. Decades of
experimentation have

yielded inconclusive results. 225 This

is not

surprising for at least two reasons. First, as some scientists have pointed
out, the amount of habitat provided by artificial reefs represents only the
smallest fraction of the overall amount of habitat in the world's oceans. 226
Second, artificial reef construction efforts in American coastal waters
have been quite modest and focused primarily on creating recreational
fishing opportunities. 227 The state-by-state efforts have been underfunded and under-monitored, leading to a lack of reliable results. 228
Indeed, these efforts fall far short of comprehensive systems used in other
countries such as Japan (which rejects recycled material altogether), that
rely extensively on artificial reefs for commercial fishing purposes. 229
222. Most of the pollution from oil platforms comes from contaminated drilling muds and
drill cuttings, pieces of rock that are moved from the well into the surrounding surface area. See
ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at148.
223. Hauke L. Kite-Powell, Down on the Farm... Raising Fish, 43 OCEANUS 1 (Sept. 21,
2004), http://www.whoi.edu/cms/files/dfino/2005/4/v43nl-kitepowell-2362.pdf. Also, non-native
farmed species may escape fisheries and act as biological pollution, causing harm to native fishes
in the area. See Mary Liz Brenninkmeyer, The Ones That Got Away: Regulating EscapedFish
and Other Pollutants from Salmon Fish Farms,27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 75, 79-87 (1999)
(discussing the adverse environmental effects of both chemical pollution and biological pollution
from salmon farms).
224. See Brenninkmeyer, supra note 223, at 79-87; Craig, supra note 104, at 163.
225. SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 23
("[T]here is a paucity of information regarding the influence of the platforms on fishery
resources, or the effects of harvesting on platform-associated species."). See also NOAA DRAFT
ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 40-43 (identifying further research needs).
226.

SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 32

(stating that the magnitude of the effects from artificial reefs is likely to be small in relation to
overall regional populations). See also Weiss, supra note 9 (noting that some marine scientists
that have avoided the debate opine that the platform's sea life is small compared to the vastness
of the ocean).
227. See NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 1 (characterizing United
States artificial reef efforts as frugal); id. at 5 (noting growing interest in use for restoring habitat,
mitigating for loss of habitat, or creating habitat); NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF
2002, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that since the 1985 plan was released, most efforts with artificial
reefs have focused on enhancing access to fishery resources).
228. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 81 (discussing continuing issue of underfunding); NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 35 (identifying
performance monitoring as voluntary).
229. NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, atl (contrasting United States
approach with that of Japan). In Japan, artificial reef construction has been funded by the
central government since the 1930s. See FRANK M. D'ITRI, ARTIFICIAL REEFS: MARINE AND
FRESHWATER APPLICATIONS 13 (Lewis Publishers 1985). The level of government funding is
unrivaled by any other nation. Id. Japan has been building reefs in part to secure independence
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The most optimistic thing that can be said about contemporary
230
artificial reef science is that the jury is still out. Yet the experiment
continues, often failing to produce reliable information about artificial
reefs.

231

B.

The PoliticalDebate

Uncertainty over the effects of artificial reefs and competing theories
regarding whether artificial reefs serve as productive marine habitat
continues to fuel the political debate over rig-to-reef programs. The
production question has heretofore been the linchpin of the debate over
whether rig-to-reef programs can be distinguished from prohibited
offshore waste disposal because of their value as marine habitat.
However, since this scientific question cannot be adequately answered,
values play a significant role in rig-to-reef policy development. Consensus
about which decommissioning option is best for the environment
continues to be elusive, and to some degree, those on both sides of the
to define the decommissioning
debate over rig-to-reef projects tend
232
analysis.
cost-benefit
problem with a
in a source of food for feeding the nation. Id. It uses a variety of structures to attract fish to near
shore areas to relieve dependence on fisheries further offshore. Despite extensive construction
efforts, there is no evidence that the number of fish has improved regionally due to the presence
of artificial reefs. Landings have stayed level, thus there may be at least some benefit in
stabilizing the fisheries and bringing fish closer to shore where fishermen can capture them.
Hiroshi Kakimoto & Hisanao Okubo, Fishery Production From Artificial Reefs, in
COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH ON ARTIFICIAL REEFS IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF NIIGATA

PREFECTURE 12 (T. Otsu trans., NMFS Trans. No. 108, 1985) (noting the value of highly stable
coastal fishery even if regional total catch has not increased). Japan has also had problems
assessing the value of artificial reefs.
230. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 26 ("if there is scientific consensus, scientists agree
that all the facts are not in").
231. Artificial reefs have been in use for decades, and the federal law promoting their use
was adopted in 1984, yet significant uncertainties still exist. The ICES Journal of Marine Science
recently had an issue dedicated to artificial reefs where the limitations of current research were
again discussed. See 59 ICES J. MARINE SCI. S1 (Oct. 2002).
232. In its simplest form, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) monetizes the benefits that accrue
from regulation and weighs this against the costs of the regulation. Proponents of CBA promote
reaching a balance between regulation and environmental degradation that is appropriate in a
world of limited resources. In fact, nowhere is this critique of environmental regulation more
adamantly lobbied than in the regulation of the petroleum industry, which has sought relief from
pollution remediation obligations. See Robert W. Wells, Jr., Without "REBECCA," CostEffective Environmental Cleanup Is An Oxymoron At Florida'sPetroleum ContaminationSites,
70-FEB FLA. B.J. 53 (1996); Victor B. Flatt, "[H]e Should at his Peril Keep it There... ". How
the Common Law Tells us that Risk Based Corrective Action is Wrong, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
341 (2001). While state rig-to-reef programs have taken funds from donating oil companies to
provide recreational benefits, it is the oil industry that will benefit most from this balancing
effort. See Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 33-35 (1998).
[I]n the real political world the strongest advocates of cost-benefit analysis are large
corporations, trade associations and associated think tanks .... Regulatees like to see
governmental intervention measured by a cost-benefit test not to make more
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The Oil Industry and Recreation Interests Unite

An important component of this debate is whether to subsidize
domestic fossil fuel production and boost recreational fishing and diving
opportunities. While both activities generate significant economic
returns, both have contributed to the decline of ocean health. 233
Not surprisingly, the oil industry is a vocal proponent of rig-to-reef
programs that make offshore disposal of defunct platforms a viable
decommissioning option. 234 Industry
representatives
are active
participants in expert commissions, also appearing on panels and in
decommissioning workshops to encourage alternatives to onshore
disposal. 235 This is particularly so in California, where a rig-to-reef
program has been repeatedly rejected. 236 Corporations are profit
maximizing entities, thus the reduction of operating costs is always an
important goal. Furthermore, under many state programs a company that
"donates" an offshore platform to an artificial reef program is rewarded
not only by avoiding significant decommissioning costs, but also by
receiving a perhaps unwarranted enhancement of its reputation as an
environmental good actor.23 7 As noted in a recent MMS study report,
"the oil industry has a keen interest in the development of a rig-to-reef
policy in California, both as a cost-savings mechanism and as an

resources available to the poor, but to make more resources available to themselves.
Even under the highly contestable assumption that a cost-benefit decision criterion
would eliminate waste, no vehicle exists for channeling the savings to the most
deserving social programs. The savings will invariably go to the regulatees, who may
or may not spend them on activities that benefit society. Absent some governmental
vehicle for directing how regulated entities spend the resources saved by less stringent
regulation, they will devote resources to things that make their shareholders happy.
Id.
233. Stephen T. Hesse, Adapting to Sea Change: ManagingMarine in the Face of Climate
Uncertainties,5 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL. 37, 38 (Spr. 2005); Felicia C. Coleman et al., The
Impact of United States RecreationalFisheries on Marine Fish Populations,305 SCIENCE 1958,
(Sept. 24, 2004).
234. The California Artificial Reef Enhancement (CARE) program was established in 1999.
It was organized to study the prospects for rig-to-reef conversions in California, and began with
seed money donated by Chevron. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 69.
235. Note that not just the employees of oil production/refining industry are included in this
grouping, but also the industry that has grown around servicing oil companies in offshore
operations. For example, WINMAR Construction, which specializes in lifecycle management for
the energy industry, boasts "Creative Disposal Solutions" for their clients, including Rigs-toReefs. WINMAR - Experience, http://www.winmar.us/experience (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
According to their promotional website materials, "Win Thornton, President of WINMAR, is a
member of the Artificial Reef Advisory Board for the state of Texas." WINMAR Construction, http://www.winmar.us/experience/disposal (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
236. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 62-72 (discussing efforts to develop and pass rig-toreef legislation in California).
237. Id. at 69. See discussion of social license to operate, infra Part III.B.2.
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opportunity for promoting its image as an environmental steward or
238
benefactor.
Recreationists-hobby fisherman, divers, and the industry that has
developed to support their ventures-are the staunchest non-oil industry
supporters of rig-to-reef programs. 239 Artificial reefs provide diving
opportunities and are popular fishing spots. Apart from industry savings,
the benefits enjoyed by recreational (and a few commercial) 24° fishing
interests have been a strong driving force behind the241development and
implementation of rig-to-reef programs in many states.
These groups are also able to argue that removal itself has
predictable environmental impacts. Decommissioning activities create air,
water, and land pollution.2 42 Another potential environmental cost of
removal is the value of marine life in the vicinity of platforms. Frequently,
platforms attract marine species that live on and surround the
structure. 243 Though unlikely to continue, in the past explosives have
been used to remove the legs from the seafloor, which kills marine life on
the structures and in the immediate vicinity. 244 Even if only a fraction of
all rigs on the U.S. OCS are currently located at sites ideal for artificial
reefs, for each rig that is removed, some marine life will be destroyed in
the process. 245 This loss is weighed in support of leaving rigs in place
238. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 69.
239. Sportsfishing organizations promote the use of artificial reefs for recreational fishing.
See Weiss, supra note 9 (discussing coalitions between the oil industry and recreational fishing
interests on rig-to-reef proposals). See also Frumkes, supra note 211, at S274 (noting that the
sportsfishing industry supported rigs-to-reefs developments). Recreational fishing provides over
$20 billion dollars to the U.S. economy and is a recognized priority of federal and state
governments. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 275.
240. Some commercial fishermen oppose rig-to-reef conversions because artificial reefs can
hinder navigation. Artificial reefs can also limit the effectiveness of trawling-the method used
by some commercial fishermen to get shrimp and other bottom dwelling fish off the bottom of
the ocean floor. Nets, long-lines, and trawlers can get caught on artificial reefs, causing property
damage and even injury to commercial fishermen. Of course, the deleterious impact of such
commercial fishing practices on the marine environment is well documented, though it remains
largely unaddressed. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 68-70 (noting interest by
recreational fishermen and resistance from commercial fishermen to rig-to-reef idea in
California).
241. See id. at 78-80.
242. COMM'N ON DIsPOSITION, supra note 2, at 47. Furthermore, the machinery and vessels
used to transport materials during the decommissioning activities may emit air and water
pollutants.
243. Dybas, supra note 100.
244. COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 47.
245. At times these organisms may even be protected by the endangered species act or
marine mammal protection act. Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Bottlenose
Dolphins and Spotted Dolphins Incidental to Oil and Gas Structure Removal Activities in the
Gulf of Mexico, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (2002) (proposing rule allowing incidental take of
bottlenose dolphins and spotted dolphins during platform removal in the Gulf of Mexico). The
GAO noted that the effects of certain decommissioning activities on the marine environment,
such as the use of explosives to remove platforms, must be better understood to further the goal
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rather than removing them. As authors of a study on the development of
international standards lamented, "[a] common wisdom has been forming
among environmentalists that the only 'right' or 'environmentally correct'
thing to do with retired offshore oil and gas platforms is to dismantle
them completely and bring all their components to shore for disposal and
salvage."246
2.
Conservationand EnvironmentalAdvocates Seek Renewed
Precaution
Environmentalists remain the most significant group opposing rig-toreef programs. Scientific uncertainty plays a critical role in their advocacy
efforts, with many arguing that scientific uncertainty regarding the value
of artificial reefs as fishery management tools must be resolved before
rig-to-reef programs are properly endorsed at a policy level. Groups such
as the Ocean Conservancy and the Natural Resources Defense Council
suggest considerably more evaluation of artificial reefs is necessary, and
they point out that little restoration of failing marine health can be
247
achieved by recreational use of artificial reefs.
But some also oppose the offshore disposal of oil platforms out of a
concern that it signals a growing acceptance of using the ocean as a
garbage receptacle.2 48 Ocean dumping of wastes is often all too easy, as
the problems of wasteful consumption are put out of sight, out of
mind-a lesson already learned in the 1970s spurring adoption of the
MPRSA. 2 49 Opponents of ocean dumping seek to advance
their
fundamental belief that industrial waste should be treated and recycled,
not dumped in the ocean. 250 Such arguments are certainly not the
exclusive province of radical environmental groups; there is wide

of environmental protection. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES, INTERIOR CAN IMPROVE ITS MANAGEMENT OF LEASE ABANDONMENT, REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, GAO/RCED-94-

82 (May 1994).
246. PULSIPHER & DANIEL, supra note 47, at 1.
247. See Ocean Conservancy, supra note 116. The Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) has also voiced concern about remote liability for removal in the future. See
Osterhoudt, supra note 116. See Bruce Alpert, Vitter Wants Rigs to Stay as Reefs Bill Would
Change Law ForcingRemoval, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 19, 2003, at 13. See also
SIMON REDDY, GREENPEACE INT'L, NO GROUND FOR DUMPING, THE DECOMMISSIONING
AND ABANDONMENT OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS PLATFORMS (1995).

248. Alpert, supra note 247.
249. See Anderson, supra note 35, at 79. See also Kindt, supra note 66, at 37 (discussing use
of ocean as garbage receptacle).
250.

Letter from Peter Melchett, Executive Director, Greenpeace-UK, to Christopher Fay,

Chairman and CEO, Shell UK (Sept. 5, 1995), quoted in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 116, at 744
(acknowledging Greenpeace's error in estimation of oil left on Brent Spar, but reiterating its

argument in opposition to ocean dumping).
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agreement that we should not deface the ocean by disposing of garbage
251
and waste products offshore.
Unlike the fairly simple matter of evaluating the cost of removal, the
environmental benefits of removing offshore platforms are vigorously
contested. 252 Even where there may be short-term harm to the
surrounding area if removal is undertaken, the long-term benefits of
cleaning up after operations is greatly appealing to those who approach
the issue from a moral obligation to return the area to its pre-drilling
state as originally contemplated and from the polluter pays standpoint
that businesses should internalize the cost of their activities. 253 A
utilitarian perspective that the removal approach yields the option of
other potential uses for the site and surrounding area in
question-particularly for ease of navigation-would also tend to focus
on the long-term benefits of platform removal.
The issue of liability has been another rallying point for
environmentalists in the political debate. The risks posed by artificial
reefs for which an owner could potentially be held liable include
interference with navigation, physical harm to users of the artificial reefs,
property damage, and unintended environmental impacts like adverse
effects on fisheries. 254 There is also the long-term risk and distinct
probability that removal of these structures may be required in the
future. 255 The prospect of the cost of remote liability (transferred to the
state and state taxpayers) must therefore be weighed against the more
readily understood cost of complete removal and the speculative benefits
of an artificial reef.
An excellent illustration of the collision between competing
viewpoints is the Brent Spar dispute, which arose out of a 1995 proposal
to dispose of a large platform owned by Shell in the North Sea. 256 The
United Kingdom initially approved the disposal, concluding that under its
laws, deepwater disposal was the "best environmental option
practicable."' 257 Reports done in connection with decommissioning the
Brent Spar suggested there was little difference, environmentally,
between a leave in place or removal option. But environmental advocates
were not persuaded by the evaluation. 258
251. See COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 48 (citing the notion that the ocean
should not become a "junkyard").
252. ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 191.
253. See Mark Sagoff, Settling America or The Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics, 12
J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349 (1992).
254. See COMM'N ON DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at 41.
255. Groups such as the NRDC have voiced concerned about the long term liability for
removal being shifted away from oil companies. See Alpert, supra note 247.
256.

ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 212.

257.

Id. at 191,212-13.

258.

SIMON REDDY, supra note 247.
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Greenpeace, the leading opponent of the proposal, argued that
dumping the Brent Spar amounted to environmental vandalism. 259 Other
environmental and community activists also refused to accept this
decision, and they led boycotts of Shell UK to push for onshore
disposal. 26 As the opposition gained momentum, some nations-even
those that had earlier sanctioned the proposal-changed their positions
2 61
and pressured the United Kingdom to reverse its decision.
Eventually, the public opposition efforts compelled Shell UK to
pursue onshore disposal. Thus, the Brent Spar dispute continues to
influence offshore disposal decisions. As one scholar noted, "since the
Brent Spar incident both companies and governments have been
attempting to delay the decommissioning of the big oil platforms in the
North Sea when abandonment occurs. '262 The dispute led to the
amendment of a regional treaty, limiting disposal, 263 and has caused some
to conclude that even the potential for a rigs-to-reefs program in the
264
North Sea is dead.
On a more abstract level, the Brent Spar incident illustrates the rise
of a concept known as corporate responsibility or a "social license to
operate. ' 265 Under this theory, oil companies must have a social license to
operate, somewhat like permission from the public above and beyond
2 66
government approvals or permits needed to conduct business activities.
Scholars who have studied this phenomenon as applied to firms that
pollute the environment observed that this new "license" often forces
firms to go beyond compliance with applicable law. 267 This theory may
help account for the difference in public opinion between rig-to-reef

259. Mankabady, supra note 29, at 612-13. The Brent Spar ended operations in September
1991. Id. at 612. Shell obtained a disposal license from the Marine Safety Agency of the DTI in
1995. Id.
260. Mankabady, supra note 29, at 612-13 (reporting that Greenpeace International and
other groups contested Shell UK's plan to dump the Brent Spar in the ocean).
261. ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 212-13. See also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 116, at 742-43
(discussing Greenpeace's Brent Spar campaign).
262. ESMAEILI, supra note 23, at 218.
263. Regional treaties, such as the OSPAR Convention in the North-East Atlantic area,
also limit some countries' options regarding decommissioning. OSPAR Commission, Sintra
Statement (July 23, 1998), available at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/md/sintra.htm.
264. See Jensen, supra note 107, at S5; Mark Baine, The North Sea Rigs-to-Reef Debate,59
ICES J. MARINE SCI. S277 (Oct. 2002).
265. These concepts are not necessarily new, but have seen rising popularity and influence
in recent times. Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan, & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and
Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
307 (2004).
266. See id. at 307 (describing a social license as the extent to which a corporation must meet
societal expectations whether or not they are embodied in current law).
267. See id. at 314 (finding evidence from the pulp and paper industry that community actors
and environmental groups may have more influence over corporate environmental compliance
than government).
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programs and the use of abandoned ships or other materials as artificial
reefs. Interestingly, the legal regime for abandoning ships at sea is less
controversial, more permissive, and even attempts by statute to promote
equitable distribution of obsolete ships among states interested in sinking
them for use as artificial reefs. 268 Unlike the process for converted rigs,
269
there is a general permit available for ocean disposal of obsolete ships.
The evidence that ships provide valuable marine habitat is no better than
that supporting decommissioned oil rigs as habitat. The only clear reason
why there is more public acceptance of ships converted to artificial reefs
than platforms is the public awareness of the environmental harms
common in all aspects of oil and gas operations and disinclination toward
2 70
Through the social license to
policies that assist the oil industry.
operate, the public influences how the wealth that is created from OCS
exploration and drilling activities should be distributed among the federal
government, states, and citizens and balanced against concern for the
environment. 271
As the Brent Spar incident illustrates, a social license to operate is an
important component of the platform removal debate. Greenpeace's
activities made public acceptance of decommissioning options a distinct
objective of industry today. 272 The oil industry is now eager to boost its
image as an environmental steward to counter the growing public
awareness that the use of fossil fuels, itself unsustainable because these
are non-renewable resources, is destroying earth's life-support system.
The public is coming to understand that extraction of oil and gas itself
creates environmental degradation, and the use of oil and gas causes air,
water, and soil pollution. Now, the failure to plan wisely for disposal of
waste production materials illustrates that each step of the entire offshore
drilling operation carries potentially negative environmental
268. National Fishing Enhancement Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1220-1220d (2000). Section
1220(b) requires that the Secretary take into consideration the number of obsolete ships that are,
or might later become, available to states for use as artificial reefs.
269. Transportation and Disposal of Vessels, 40 C.F.R. § 229.3 (2005). The structure must be
cleaned of all pollutants prior to disposal. Permit terms require advance notice to EPA,
supervision by Coast Guard, and other requirements relating to site choice and methods of
sinking.
270. Arguably, the identity of the donor makes a significant difference in public acceptance.
Oil companies that donate rigs enjoy the rare opportunity to enhance their reputation as a
"good" environmental actor. The incongruence of shipwrecks and rigs regulations supports the
argument that the public's perception of the oil industry as anti-environmental contributes to
skepticism of rigs-to-reef policy. See Mistretta, supra note 9.
271. Sharing revenues with coastal states directly or creating a fund for coastal
environmental improvement projects are two suggestions that lawmakers have discussed.
Initiatives in California and Florida also illustrate this broad public concern for environmental
effects of offshore drilling.
272. See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas
Industry,36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457, 467 (2004) (citing the Brent Spar incident as bringing
the corporate social responsibility trend to light).
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consequences. What the rig-to-reef debate illustrates is that for a "social
license to operate" to be effective, industry must not only appear to be
operating responsibly, but the public must also demand meaningful
results. 273 Without significantly more information about the effects of
artificial reefs, good or bad, providing industry with reputation
enhancement for the rig-to-reef "partnership" is unwarranted.
To reverse the damage from pollution and overfishing that has come
from competing uses of the ocean, more aggressive strategies must be
implemented. An important step is to commit to conducting future ocean
activities, including offshore drilling and fishing, in a long-term
sustainable manner. Sustainable development meets the needs of people
today without compromising the potential for future generations to meet
their needs. 27 4 It requires that environmental stewardship, economic
development, and social development be reconciled and treated as coequal goals. 275 In the current legal framework, energy demand and
recreational interests have far overshadowed environmental stewardship,
posing serious concern about the sustainability of these practices. The
platform removal debate and rig-to-reef programs must be placed
responsibly within the larger scheme of multiple-use ocean management
and offshore federalism that is evolving today.
IV.
REFLECTING ON THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM:
FRAGMENTATION OF OCEAN LAW AND THE CONTINUING CONTEST

OVER MANAGING THE OCS

What the ongoing debate over rig-to-reef programs obscures is the
failure of fisheries laws and offshore oil development practices to achieve
sustainable use of the ocean's resources. Fundamentally, oil and gas
regulation as well as fisheries management have anthropocentric regimes
dominated by economic interests. Neither regime achieves sustainable
utilization of natural resources and both regimes incorporate elements
obviously antithetical to sustainable use precepts. As a result, these two
areas of law-in addition to the broader interdisciplinary approach to
ocean management-have been the subjects of lengthy debate over the
form and substance of much needed reform. It is commonly recognized
that our legal infrastructure must be reworked to improve the health of
ocean ecosystems and to ensure that long-term benefits can be obtained
from this invaluable natural resource. 276 These failings of ocean

273.

This is consistent with other initiatives that rely on information disseminated to the

public. See id.
274. OUR COMMON FUTURE: THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT

AND

DEVELOPMENT (Gro Harlem Brundtland ed., Oxford University Press 1987).
275. Id.
276. See generally OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20; PEW REPORT, supra note 53;
Kristen M. Fletcher, Fix It! Constructinga Recommendation to the Ocean Commission for the
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stewardship created the problems that rig-to-reef programs seek to
address, as two unsustainable practices converge.
A.

Oil and Gas Regulation

There are two main shortcomings of offshore oil and gas regulation
that drive rig-to-reef policy development. First is the ongoing competition
between coastal states and the federal government over management of
OCS resources. Second is the related problem of inadequate planning for
long-term OCS exploitation.
1.

The State-FederalConflict on the OCS

Coastal states and the federal government have long fought for
277
Offshore oil
dominion over coastal waters and their natural resources.
production has been the primary catalyst of ongoing conflict; while
coastal states bear many of the risks of offshore drilling, the federal
278
government receives the direct benefits in the form of federal revenue.
While the risk of a large oil spill continues to receive attention, of
growing concern is the significant lack of study on the chronic, low-level,
and cumulative impacts on the marine and human environment levied by
279
This basic inequity has prompted
offshore exploration and drilling.
in recent decades to prevent
lengths
great
many coastal states to go to
drilling in federal waters off their shores. This has happened particularly
in California and Florida where healthy coastal environments are central
to the economy. ° The concession to allow states to develop their own
artificial reef programs, possibly even managing such reefs if permitted in
federal waters, is an unusual compromise in a typically contentious turf
Future of Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93 (2002). This is also evident given the
numerous proposals for amendments to the OCSLA and laws governing ocean activities.
277. This enduring dispute is popularly known as the "Seaweed Rebellion." FITZGERALD,
supra note 47, at 53-82.
278. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 98-206, at 26-30 (1983); Barry Hart Dubner, Problem on the United
States Continental Shelf-Measuringthe Environmental "Effectiveness" of the Outer Continental
ShelfAct (OSCA), 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 519, 530 (1994); OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra

note 20, at 359.
279. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 361. In addition to recognizing the negative
impacts on bottom dwelling organisms and destruction of habitat, the report also calls for more
information on the chronic, low level impacts, and cumulative impacts on the marine, coastal,
and human environment levied by offshore oil and gas drilling operations.
280. John K. Van de Kamp & John A. Saurenman, Outer ContinentalShelf Oil and Gas
Leasing: What Role for the States?, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 112-1124 (1990) (discussing

California's political approach and local ordinances to influence drilling decisions); Sierra B.
Weaver, Local Management of Natural Resources:Should Local Governments Be Able to Keep
Oil Out?, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 242-50 (2002) (discussing California efforts to prevent

offshore oil drilling through local laws); Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Florida's
Experience With Offshore Energy Development, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2002)

(discussing Florida's evolution from supporter to opponent of offshore drilling).
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battle. Such an approach, however, has an obvious downside under the
current offshore drilling revenue-sharing regime as discussed further in
this section.
While federal supremacy offshore was initially an issue decided by
the Supreme Court, 281 a series of federal statutes now regulates many
aspects of the complex relationship between states and the federal
government in offshore waters. 282
Generally, the coastal states have jurisdiction from the shore
outward to the three-mile mark, 283 although the federal government
retained a navigational servitude within this area for the purposes of
commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs. 284
Beyond the three-mile mark, the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction and has claimed an exclusive economic zone to the 200-mile
mark. 285 This division of responsibility at the three-mile mark, based on
an arbitrary delineation from an ecological standpoint, is a central feature
of many contemporary disputes, particularly over the regulation of
286
offshore oil drilling practices.

281. In the first Supreme Court case to consider the issue, United States v. State of
California, the federal government contested California's rights to lease offshore areas for oil
and gas development. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). California argued that it had title to the area adjacent
to its coasts based on Pollard v. Hagan. Id. at 30-31 (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845)).
Pollard vested ownership of inland waters to states on an equal footing basis to the original
thirteen colonies which had obtained rights to inland water from the crown. However, the Court
found no such ownership of offshore waters could be claimed by either the original colonies or
later admitted states. The Supreme Court determined that the federal government, rather than
the state, had authority over offshore resources beyond the low water mark. Id. at 36. Following
this case, similar litigation ensued between the United States and Texas, Louisiana, as well as
other coastal states. See, e.g., United States v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States
v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). These Supreme
Court rulings did not end the contests between coastal states and the federal government, which
now litigate questions of control and management over OCS resources under federal statutes.
282. The three main statutes provide this regulation. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1301, 1331-1356 (2000); Federal Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315
(2002); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000). See generally
FITZGERALD, supra note 47. The history of the state-federal conflict on the OCS has been much
discussed in the literature. For a concise discussion, see Wiygul, supra note 50 (providing a
backdrop to the power struggle between the federal government and the states as well as the
statutory framework of OCS development).
283. 43 U.S.C. § 1312. The seaward boundary of each coastal state is generally three
geographical miles from the coast line. However, for historical reasons the boundaries for Texas
and Florida are broader than three miles. For further discussion of the history of the offshore
boundary dispute between coastal states and the federal government, see Robert Jay Wilder,
The Three-Mile Territorial Sea: Its Origins and Implications For Contemporary Offshore
Federalism,32 VA. J. INT'L L. 681 (Spring 1992).
284. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a).
285. Consistent with UNCLOS III, supra note 63, art. 57.
286. See Wilder, supra note 283 (arguing for reevaluation of the state-federal delineation
given the increasing uses of the OCS).
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) is the primary
287
statute governing offshore oil drilling. A key feature of the OCSLA is
to lease
its leasing provisions, which authorize the federal government
288 The federal
tracts of land on the OCS to private companies.
government receives bonus bid monies from oil companies competing for
offshore leases, as well as lease payments and royalties from lessees on
the minerals and gas extracted from OCS areas leased to such private
parties. Unlike the revenue-sharing regimes used on public lands
federal government
onshore, 289 only in limited circumstances does the
29° Furthermore, to the
states.
coastal
share revenues with the adjacent
extent other statutes provide states some influence over drilling off their
291
shores, it is certainly limited. The federal government is not obligated
287. See discussion supra Part I.B on OCSLA.
288. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
government
289. Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, affected states and the federal
as amended
(codified
437
Stat.
41
109-80,
No.
L.
Pub.
share revenues from minerals extraction.
in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (2000)).
a small increment
290. When a well site is located within three miles of the state boundary
1337(g) of the
of these royalties is shared directly with adjacent states pursuant to section
affected
provide
to
intended
is
scheme
sharing
revenue
This
OCSLA. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g).
economic and
coastal states with "funds which may be used for the mitigation of adverse
areas. 43 U.S.C. §
environmental effects related to the development..." of adjacent offshore
payments-quite
1332(4)(B). Despite this modest revenue-sharing provision, these mitigation
states and
between
tension
the
alleviate
to
little
done
have
land
dry
unlike the regimes used on
supra note 20, at
the federal government over offshore drilling. See OCEAN COMM'N REPORT,
revenues). This has
359 (discussing difference between minerals leasing act onshore and OCSLA
between coastal
led many to suggest increased revenue-sharing as a solution to ongoing tension
Policy Act of
Energy
recent
the
and
drilling,
offshore
over
government
states and the federal
in part to
government
federal
the
2005 increased revenue sharing between coastal states and
production.
gas
and
oil
domestic
support increased
pursuant to the
291. Coastal states do have some influence over drilling off their shores
Management
Zone
Coastal
the
enacted,
was
OCSLA
the
after
Shortly
current legal framework.
as amended at
Act (CZMA) was adopted. Pub. L. No.89-454, § 301, 80 Stat. 303 (1966) (codified
of state
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (2000)). Under the CZMA, Congress recognized the importance
to
states
for
potential
the
and
resources,
involvement in federal programs affecting ocean
to
proximity
their
of
"Because
1451(m).
§
U.S.C.
16
plans.
management
resource
develop ocean
significant
and
substantial
have
states
coastal
the
and reliance upon the ocean and its resources,
of the excusive
interests in the protection, management, and development of the resources
in all Federal
states
coastal
of
participation
active
economic zone that can only be served by the
of state
development
the
buy
appropriate,
wherever
and,
resources
such
affecting
programs
programs."
management
zone
coastal
approved
ocean resource plans as part of their federally
(CMP), a longThe CZMA encouraged each coastal state to adopt a Coastal Management Plan
1455. Federal
§
U.S.C.
16
areas.
coastal
in
term plan for the multiplicity of uses contemplated
submit their CMPs
States
programs
coastal
developed
that
states
for
available
assistance
funding
its proposed
to the DOI for approval. Upon approval, the federal government must conform
agency conducting
coastal zone activities with the contents of the relevant CMP: "[Elach Federal
or support those
or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct
with approved
activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent
programs."
state management
291. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1). This provision is known as the "consistency determination."
power over OCS
Many commentators believed CZMA would give the state a "veto"
CZMA note the
development. Recognizing the potential impact on U.S. sovereignty, critics of
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to defer to a particular state's environmental concerns. 292 This has made
several states powerless to prevent continued leasing through applicable
statutes, which has then led to political maneuverings. 293
Some contend the resulting division of authority over the oceans
contributes to the failure of governing laws to achieve sustainable use. 294
Certainly, with increased activities, the potential for conflicting
uses
occurring on the OCS, and the great wealth potentially obtainable
from
ocean resources, this dispute will continue. 295
2.

Limited Vision for Sustaining Outer Continental Shelf Resources

Another shortcoming of existing law is the federal government's lack
of vision for long term sustainability of the ocean resource. As
just
discussed, OCSLA was designed to achieve "cooperative federalism,"
in
recognition of the competing goals of coastal states and the federal
government with respect to offshore oil exploration and leasing
decisions. 296 Affected states have a consulting role in the process
to
determine where oil drilling will occur and thus where a particular
oil
platform will be located on the OCS. 297 However, under current law
each
statute provides excessive power to coastal states which can interfere
with the national agenda.
See Bruce Kuhse, The Federal ConsistencyRequirements of the Coastal
Zone Management Act of
1972: It's Time to Repeal This FundamentallyFlawed Legislation, 6 OCEAN
& COASTAL L. J. 77
(2001). But see John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse
Pre-Emption or
ContractualFederalism?,6 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 109 (2001) (countering
that CZMA is an
important tool for state-federal relationships and management of the
coastal zone); Wiygul,
supra note 50, at 157 (discussing how no veto power inured to states
with consistency
determinations). Tension between coastal states and the federal
government over the
consistency determination provision of the CZMA continues, with areas
of conflict including the
timing and generation of environmental information required for adequate
state review of OCS
projects. The recent Energy Policy Act of 2005 modified the time period
for the decision and
appeal process, in part as a response to criticism that consistency determinations
were unduly
delaying energy projects. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 381, 119 Stat. 594,
737-38 (2005) (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1465).
292. Wiygul, supra note 50, at 157.
293. Instead, coastal states have used other measures such as legislative
tools and local laws
to prevent offshore development. See Lynn S. Sletto, Piecemeal Legislative
Proposals:An
InappropriateApproach to ManagingOffshore Oil Drilling,33 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 557,
566-82 (2003) (discussing legislative tools used to stop leasing). See also
Weaver, supra note 281,
at 242-50 (discussing California state and local efforts to prevent oil drilling
on the California
coast).
294. See Wilder, supra note 286 (proposing more cooperative state-federal
partnership for
developing OCS resources).
295. For example, see proposals such as the Stewardship for Our Coasts
and Opportunities
for Reliable Energy Act, S. 1206, 109th Cong. (2005), and the Offshore
Fairness Act of 2005, S.
735, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing extension of seaward boundaries
of Louisiana, Mississippi
and Alabama).
296. See supra notes 290-291 discussing cooperative federalism in the
context of OCSLA
and CZMA.
297. This consulting role is provided via the Coastal Zone Management
Act consistency
requirements. See supra note 291.
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step in the oil drilling program is evaluated for environmental impact
production, and
exploration and
sale,
separately: lease
298
Thus, analysis of the final stages of oil exploration
decommissioning.
299
If rig-toand extraction is deferred until decommissioning is imminent.
reef programs become simply a matter of toppling existing platforms in
place and relying on adjacent states to manage their continuing presence,
the initial decision about where to place an oil platform is determinative
3
of the separate issue of where an artificial reef should be located. () This
suggests that both the federal and state governments must focus on the
long-term use of ocean areas so that non-renewable resource extraction
does not drive long-term use of ocean areas. Under current law, adequate
analysis of the final stages of operations 30is1 deferred-making waste
generation a mere afterthought to extraction.

In
298. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires environmental review.
for any
general, NEPA requires that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be prepared
major projects undertaken or approved by the federal government that may have a significant
§ 4332(c)
impact on the environment. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
and
indirect
effects-direct,
the
about
analysis
detailed
(2000). This document contains
require
cumulative-of the proposed activities on the environment. However, NEPA does not
be
that projects with significant impacts be rejected; it merely requires that decision-makers
Bay
aware of the environmental consequences of major federal projects. See Strycker's
impose
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (establishing that NEPA does not
oil and gas
substantive requirements). Specific limitations of NEPA in the regulation of offshore
operations include the problem of tiered review. A frequently criticized aspect of NEPA,
specific
particularly in the context of oil and gas regulation, is that tiered review allows
See
process.
drilling
offshore
the
of
stages
different
at
impacts
evaluation of environmental
v.
Tribal Village of Akutun v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1988); North Slope Borough
of
process
the
for
EIS
overarching
one
of
Instead
1980).
Cir.
(D.C.
609
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589,
EIS for
leasing, exploring, drilling and decommissioning, the government is able to do a separate
operation,
drilling
offshore
approved
an
of
impacts
environmental
The
each individual stage.
the
from start to finish, are never fully explored in a single study. This has led many to criticize
offshore
of
impact
environmental
of
extent
true
the
"dilute"
to
appears
it
as
tiering approach,
id. at
drilling. Wiygul, supra note 50, at 103-04 (describing review process as "pyramidal");
the
in
later
used
be
might
review
minimal
to
subject
information
that
fact
165-66 (discussing
tiered process to justify development). Also, a state's concern about the effects of a catastrophic
does
accident (like the Santa Barbara spill of 1969) is not addressed by NEPA, because NEPA
490
not require a worst-case scenario analysis. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
is
This
1984).
Cir.
(9th
612-13
605,
F.2d
733
Clark,
v.
Pass
False
of
Village
(1989);
U.S. 332, 354
scenario
so even in the most sensitive environmental areas. For example, the worst-case
MMS for
approach has been rejected specifically with regards to an EIS prepared by the
coast.
north
Alaska's
in
development
gas
and
development and production plans for oil
Edwardsen v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 268 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2001).
299. Decommissioning is a major federal action that triggers the requirements for an
environmental impact statement under NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).
300. See discussion supra Part II.B on Gulf State rig-to-reef programs.
301. See discussion supra note 298 on tiered NEPA environmental review.
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FisheriesManagement Looks to HabitatProtection

Timing has much to do with the development of rig-to-reef policy
and related legislative efforts in recent years. Offshore disposal advocates
benefit from the opportunity to connect their efforts with other means of
addressing the growing problem-first widely observed in the 1970s-of
rapidly disappearing fish stocks. 3° 2 Experts agree that overfishing is the
greatest threat to fisheries and fish habitat. 303 Yet, various legislative
efforts to address this problem have largely proven unsuccessful due to

the powerful influence of fishing interests. 3° 4
Congress adopted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act in 1976 to address the growing problem of overfishing
of federally managed fisheries. 305 Twenty years later, the Sustainable
Fisheries Act amendments sought to improve the shortcomings of this
statute to halt the growing crisis of declining catch. 306 In addition to
302.

See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL
RESOURCES

LAW AND POLICY 428 (Foundations Press 2004) [hereinafter RASBAND ET AL.] (describing
the
decline in various fish populations in the waters of the United States). Out of the world's
fifteen
major fisheries, thirteen have experienced serious decreases in productivity. Gareth
Porter,
Fisheries Subsidies Overfishing and Trade, 16 ENV'T AND TRADE 10 (United
Nations
Environment Programme ed., 2000). Overfishing as well as habitat loss and degradation
have
been noted as drivers of fishery collapse. RASBAND ET AL., supra, at 434-38. Overfishing
occurs
when fish are caught at a rate greater than the population can replenish itself. See PEW
REPORT,
supra note 53, at 35 ("The principle problem is that we catch too many fish, and far too
quickly,
for nature to replace."). Two types of overfishing are growth overfishing and recruitment
overfishing. Growth overfishing occurs when too many fish are taken before they reach
a size
where further growth will be offset by predatory mortality. Recruitment overfishing occurs
when
fishers leave too few mature fish for producing a sufficient number of eggs to create
"recruits"
for the stock. RASBAND ET AL., supra, at 442. An unsustainable take of fishery resources
causes
both a reduction in fish populations and a serious disruption to the ocean ecosystem.
When
overfishing of one target fish population reduces catches to economically unsustainable
levels,
lower value fish are targeted and then overfished. This process, called "fishing down
the food
web," disrupts the natural benefits of biodiversity resulting in reduced populations and
reduced
sustainability of entire assemblages of fish populations. PEW REPORT, supra note 53, at
40-41.
303. See PEW REPORT, supra note 53, at 35-43 (discussing. the decline of fish populations
caused by overfishing). See generallyOCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20,
at 274-303
(discussing the problems of overfishing and the effects of destroying "essential fish habitat").
304. See Teresa M. Clotier, Conflicts of Interest on RegionalFisheryManagement
Councils:
Corruption or Cooperative Management?,2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 101 (1996);.Peter
Van
Tuyn, Courage Without Conviction: Cause for Chaos in U.S. Marine FisheriesManagement,
28
VT. L. REV. 663, 666-667 (2004) (discussing limited government capacity to police
improper
influence due to regulatory structure); Rory Bahader, Big Boats, Big Crews, The Biggest
Seas
and Little Licenses. Exposing the Regulatory ParadoxAllowing the Existence of the "Uninspected
Fish Processing Vessel", 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 219, 227 (discussing industry influence
on
fishing regulations). See also OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 275 (noting
that
regional fisheries management counsels often made decisions favoring fishing interests
and
increased catch limits rather than conservation goals).
305. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§
1801-1882 (2000).
306. Sustainable Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2000). Depletion of
fishery
resources were originally attributed to foreign fishers, however nearly thirty-years
after the
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efforts to limit the amount of fishing (both commercial and recreational)
to help rebuild fisheries and obtain "maximum sustained yield" of
were
important fisheries, Regional Fishery Management Councils
3°7 Such
established and directed to set up Fishery Management Plans.
Plans identify areas of "essential fish habitat" (EFH) to assist in
minimizing the degradation of habitat by overfishing and other activities
3°8 EFH is defined as "those
potentially destructive to marine habitat.
waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or
growth to maturity. ' '3°9 Regulations further expand the definition of
EFH.310 Once designated, Fishery Management Councils are required to
minimize adverse effects to EFH caused by fishing, and federal agencies
must consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
regarding actions authorized, funded, or undertaken that might adversely
311
affect EFH.
A key problem with these legislative efforts is that scientists have
struggled to identify the precise habitat that fish require both generally
312 The problems encountered
and at different times in a given lifecycle.
here are quite similar to those in artificial reef science. The lack of
scientific certainty as to which areas to designate undermines the EFH
designation process in a number of ways. Initial designations were made
313 To account for this uncertainty,
on the basis of limited knowledge.
314 Thus, it is possible that such
EFH designations were quite broad.
to
Magnuson Act removed foreign fishers, amendments were needed to emphasize the need
reduce the pressure domestic fishing places on fisheries. Coleman, supra note 233, at 1958.
of
307. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 275. Recognizing the damaging effects
scientific
overfishing, the Commission's report recommends requiring FMCs to use of the best
information available when determining "the maximum amount of fish that can be harvested
fish
without adversely affecting recruitment or other key biological components of the
population." Id. at 277.
of the
308. These provisions have been compared to the habitat protection provisions
ESA
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Although not specifically a fisheries management law, the
be
cannot
fingers
coral
Thus,
(2000).
protects certain corals from destruction. 16 U.S.C. § 1536
without
structures
platform
remove
to
activities
blasting
using
industry
the
by
destroyed
permit is
resultant liability under the ESA section 9 "take" prohibition, unless an incidental take
first issued.
309. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2000).
their
310. 50 C.F.R. § 600.10 (2005) further defines EFH. Waters include aquatic areas and
include
may
and
fish
by
used
are
that
properties
associated physical, chemical, and biological
hard
aquatic areas historically used by fish where appropriate; substrate includes sediment,
necessary
communities;
biological
associated
and
waters,
bottom, structures underlying the
means the habitat required to support a sustainable fishery and the managed species'
maturity"
contribution to a healthy ecosystem; and "spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to
covers a species' full life cycle.
311. 50 C.F.R. § 600.920 (2005).
312. See Fletcher & O'Shea, supra note 210, at 71 (discussing difficulties in designating
EFH).
had
313. See id. at 59 (stating that while some councils had studies to rely on, other councils
sources).
anecdotal
or
data
limited
to rely on
314. See id. at 71 (noting that the entire Gulf of Mexico was designated as EFH).
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designations included areas that were not all that important for spawning,
breeding, feeding, or growth and failed to capture some areas that might
have been much more important. For these two related reasons, EFH
designations have not been effective in protecting fish species. 315 Finally,
while the exercise of identifying habitat that is essential to promote
healthy fisheries has proved important "to increase awareness of the
magnitude of habitat issues facing our nation's declining fisheries...," it
has not been particularly successful in conserving such habitat due to an
additional weakness in enforcement mechanisms. 316
Whether artificial reefs can provide "essential fish habitat" as part of
a fishery management plan was identified as an important issue in the rigto-reef policymaking process. In 2002, the NMFS, the expert federal
agency that provides recommendations on EFH designations, concluded
that artificial reefs, including those converted from rigs, could be
designated as EFH in fishery management plans. 317 However, because of
the weaknesses of EFH designation guidelines, the potential designation
of a particular artificial reef as EFH is unremarkable.3 18 EFH
designations have now been augmented by "special management zone"
designations, and the NMFS has also designated a subset of all EFH,
approximately 1 percent, as "habitat of particular concern" for
ecologically important or particularly vulnerable habitat. 319 Fishery
Management Councils have also been criticized for succumbing to
"regulatory capture" by interest groups that promote the fishing
industry,
undermining confidence in EFH designations. 320 This problem has led to
calls for reforming the composition of Fishery Management Councils. 321
Despite the obvious degradation of the ocean resource caused by
overfishing, Congress, the executive, and states have all been active in
seeking to enhance recreational fishing opportunities in coastal waters.
The public trust doctrine espouses the view that the waters of the states
315. See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF
THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY-GOVERNORS' DRAFT 243 (Apr. 2004)
[hereinafter
GOVERNORS' DRAFT].

316. See Fletcher & O'Shea, supra note 210, at 97; id. at 68 ("Even though increased
attention to habitat has been considered a breakthrough in fisheries management paradigms,
the
requirements of the Magnuson Act still amount to a voluntary and generally unenforceable
scheme.").
317. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, Essential Fish Habitat, 67 Fed. Reg. 2343 (Jan. 17,
2002).
318. The Preliminary Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy noted that EFH
regulations need to be reworked. GOVERNORS' DRAFT, supra note 315, at 243.

319. Id.
320. See Marianne Cufone, Will there Always Be Fish in the Sea? The U.S. Fishery
Mangement Process,19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 28, 34 (2004); OCEAN COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 20, at 502; PEW REPORT, supra note 53, at 44 (discussing regulatory capture
of fishery

management councils).
321. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 502; Fletcher, supra note 276, at 117-24.
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should be held in trust for the public, traditionally for fishing, swimming,
and commerce-although in modern times conservation has also been
322
held to promote the public trust. Fishing for recreational purposes is a
public trust use. Beyond this longstanding interest protected by the public
the
trust doctrine, under the Sport Fish Restoration Act the DOI has
323 The
specific task of enhancing fishing opportunities for recreation.
NFEA and similar state measures to increase fishing opportunities reflect
a continuing public interest in using coastal waters for recreational
fishing. President Clinton highlighted the importance of recreational
fishing in an Executive Order in 1995.324
Unfortunately, these efforts have not been accompanied by
meaningful data collection or research on the impact of recreational
325 The extent to which
fishing on marine habitat and fishery stocks.
recreational fishing detracts from ongoing efforts to protect fisheries
remains, therefore, largely unknown. 326 Some published studies, however,
conclude that recreational fishing is responsible for more of the fish
harvested in some regions, such as the Gulf of Mexico, than commercial
fishing.327 While in general recreational fishing methods are often much
322. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (establishing the public
trust doctrine); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (supporting the idea that
conservation is an appropriate public trust purpose). See also Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil
Exploration, Environmental Protection, and ContractRepudiation: It's Time to Recognize the
Public Trust in the Outer Continental Shelf, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,104 (2000) (discussing the
application of the public trust doctrine to the outer continental shelf); Donna R. Christie, Marine
Reserves, the PublicTrust Doctrine and IntergenerationalEquity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
427,432 (2004) (discussing public trust doctrine and recreational fishing).
323. Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 777 (2000). Some artificial
reef projects are funded by the Wallop-Breaux Amendment. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1014(b), 98
Stat. 1016 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 777).
324. Exec. Order No. 12,962, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,769 (June 9, 1995).
325. NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service conducts the Marine Recreational Fisheries
Statistics Survey (MRFSS), initiated in 1979. Some have suggested the greatest weakness in the
survey is the intercept points. Others point to the potential for underestimation of catch by
recreational anglers. See OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 281. The National
Academy of Science is undertaking a project entitled Review of RecreationalFisheries Survey
Methods, Project Identification Number: OSBX-U-04-05-A, sponsored by NOAA and estimated
to be completed in mid-2006.
326. Coleman, supra note 233, at 1958 (noting that even after the Magnuson Stevens
amendments, although commercial fishing was scrutinized, recreational fishing was afforded
little attention as contributing to the problem of overfishing). See OCEAN COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 20, at 281 (noting the need for improved data collection on recreational fishing).
327. Last year the Gulf of Mexico Regional Fisheries Council cut short the recreational
fishing season when it determined quotas had been reached early. See Closure of the
Recreational Red Snapper Component, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,818 (Oct. 28, 2004). The National
Marine Fisheries Service also implemented a seasonal closure of the recreational grouper fishery
from November to December 2005, and implemented a reduction on bag limit to assist in
achieving a red grouper stock-rebuilding plan. See Gulf Grouper Recreational Management
Measures, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (July 25, 2005). See also Coleman, supra note 233, at 1959 (noting
that among fish populations of concern, 64 percent of landings in the Gulf of Mexico were
recreational landings). Responding to a critique that the article maligned recreational fishermen,
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less directly destructive of ocean habitat than commercial methods (such
as trawling), recreational fishing can contribute to overfishing,
exacerbating habitat destruction, and other negative effects. The growing
evidence about the magnitude of recreational fishing led the Ocean
Commission to recommend further studies of the impact of recreational
fishing on sustainable fisheries and emphasize the importance of
habitat. 32 8 Like the growing recognition of the destructive nature of some
recreational activities on land, we have slowly come to understand that
recreational use of the ocean also contributes to the decline in ocean
ecosystems by reducing the number of fish, even if recreational fishing
methods are less destructive to marine habitat than commercial
329
methods.
Thus, the interest in artificial reefs stems not only from interest in
providing more places for recreationists to visit, but also from the
deterioration and destruction of natural ocean habitats. The causes of
natural reef deterioration and destruction are multiple, but experts agree
that overfishing does the most to destroy reef habitat. 330 The unavoidable
conclusion is that fishing itself must be more strictly regulated-through
amending or simply replacing current laws-to reduce habitat
destruction. Although habitat is an important part of the whole picture in
improving the health of fisheries, we cannot rely on artificial reefs to
rebuild fisheries. And it is certainly a danger that a focus on artificial reef
habitat will distract attention from efforts to reduce the impacts of fishing
331
itself.

the authors of this study noted that "[i]n the Gulf of Mexico, four of the five most productive
species that are over-fished are taken primarily by recreational anglers .
Felicia C. Coleman
et al., Letters to the Editor, 307 SCIENCE 1561 (Mar. 11, 2005).
328. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 297 ("[M]aintaining healthy, functioning
habitats is an essential element of an ecosystem-based management approach.").
329. See Coleman, supra note 233, at 1959 ("Where recreational fishery landings rival those
of commercial fisheries for major stocks of concern, sometimes even replacing them, they can
have equally serious ecological and economic consequences on fished populations."). Legally
sanctioned commercial fishing methods such as trawling can cause significant damage to habitat.
See Van Tuyn, supra note 304, at 664-65 (discussing habitat damage from commercial trawling).
However, as noted by fisheries experts, both commercial and recreational fishing have similar
ecological effects in that they both can "truncate size and age structures, reduce biomass, and
alter community composition." Coleman, supra note 233, at 1959.
330. Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection?Fishingand
CoralReef Marine Reserves in Floridaand Hawaii,34 MCGEORGE L. REv. 155, 161-66 (2003).
331. See Polovina, supra note 160, at 38.
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V.

MOVING FROM OPTIMISM TO RESULTS

A.

Ocean Management Failures

The declining health of the oceans and fisheries has been identified
332
as one of the most pressing global environmental issues of our time.
The prevailing but misguided belief that the ocean is beyond human
impact and that its resources are inexhaustible has been conclusively
discredited. Over a decade ago, at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), consensus among nations
reflected the global view that ocean health is failing, and nations must
take affirmative efforts to protect ocean resources. 333 Nonetheless,
despite international and national recognition of the negative human
impacts on the ocean, the paradigm of inexhaustibility 334 remains
entrenched in the U.S. legal and political system. This paradigm has
continued to reign, particularly in the areas of offshore minerals
extraction and fishing, inhibiting aggressive changes in law and policy to
335
stop human activities from degrading the marine environment.
The lack of an adequate response to the failing health of the ocean is
due in part to the slow and uncoordinated development of ocean law in
the United States, which lags far behind the development of terrestrial
environmental laws.3 36 As one expert of ocean regulation recently
explained: "[T]he United States lacks a single coherent policy regarding
its marine resources, which are instead managed through a sometimes
bewildering array of federal, state, and local laws, implemented through
numerous federal, state, and local regulatory entities whose mission and
priorities do not always dovetail neatly." 337 This is certainly a fair
description of the legal framework for rig-to-reef conversions, which
involves the federal government and coastal states, competing concerns

332. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 116, at 673-707 (discussing conservation of living
marine resources).
333. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Brazil,
June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, Ch. 17, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1.
334. Robin Kundis Craig, Sustaining the Unknown Seas. Changes in U.S. Ocean Policy and
Regulation Since Rio '92, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,190, 10,191 (2002) (using term "paradigm of
inexhaustibility").
335. John A. Duff, Offshore Management Considerations:Law and Policy Questions Related
to Fish, Oil, and Wind, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 401 (2004) (promoting movement out
to sea of governance models employed to manage other public resources).
336. See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical
Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649 (2002)
(discussing development of ocean regulations in the United States). Craig points out that
"terrestrial ecosystems have received much legal attention in recent years." Id. at 674. She
examines the Oceans Act of 2000 as Congressional recognition of the need to improve existing
ocean laws. Id. at 671-72; Fletcher, supra note 276.
337. Craig, supra note 334, at 10,192.
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about ocean dumping regulated under the MPRSA, fisheries
management and attention to marine habitat, restrictions to preserve
unhindered navigation, and of course oil and gas regulation.
The Ocean Commission's report to the President about the future of
the oceans bluntly summarized the need for legal reform. Increased
competition for ocean space, the emergence of potential new ocean uses,
the decline of vital commercial fishery stocks, the unresolved debate over
offshore energy and mineral development, and the persistence of marine
pollution were all listed as reasons for immediate reform. 338 The
Commission recommended consolidating the multiplicity of federal
agencies to organize expertise and better effectuate environmental
protections. 339 Joining other voices in the ocean reform movement, the
Commission specifically criticized the OCSLA by citing the need for
expanded sharing of revenues and increased involvement by coastal
states. 340
The Ocean Commission's report identified two overarching goals
that bear directly on the debate over rig-to-reef programs: to strive for
sustainability of the ocean resource and move to an ecosystem
management approach. 341 Sustainability conforms to the United States'
international support of sustainable development principles in several
different resource use contexts, and incorporating ecosystem
management principles is now frequently a goal of federal natural
342
resource agencies.
In fact, prior to the Commission's report, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS) released a working draft of its efforts to incorporate
sustainable development principles into resource management
objectives. 343 MMS concluded that despite the important role of offshore
oil and gas to our current economy and standard of living, "because oil
and gas are exhaustible resources, the production and use of which can
cause environmental damage, society at large should consider how the

338. GOVERNORS' DRAFT, supra note 315, at 25-26. The private sector has also undertaken
similar efforts to improve ocean management and governance. The Pew Foundation recently
completed a similar study and released its findings to the public. See Kathryn J. Mengerink, The
Pew Oceans Commission Report: Navigatinga Route to Sustainable Seas, 31 ECOLOGY L. 0. 689
(2004).
339. See Fletcher, supra note 276, at 126, 131-32 (suggesting among other things the creation
of a federal Oceans Agency, and that NOAA be moved from Department of Commerce to
reduce economic incentives of fisheries).
340. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 359-60.
341. Id. at 472.
342.

See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, RONALD H. ROSENBERG & HOLLY D. DOREMUS,

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 324-30 (Foundation Press 2002) (discussing the ecosystem
management approach).
343.

MINERALS MGMT. SERV., OCS RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 24, 1999), availableat http://www.mms.gov/SD-FINAL2.PDF.
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wealth created by these resources is used." 344 This statement recognizes
that the serious trade-offs made in offshore drilling-specifically the
exploitation of non-renewable resources to the possible detriment of
renewable resources-should be publicly endorsed. The rise of corporate
social responsibility and the social license to operate has illustrated the
wider public's interest in ensuring more than trickle-down benefit from
natural resource exploitation by private entities.345 Although existing law
may not adequately express the public's demand for a fair return on the
use of public resources, the social license to operate is beginning to
exercise influence. 346 As an important part of the entire mix of ocean
activities, unsustainable offshore oil drilling practices can threaten other
efforts aimed at improving ocean sustainability. This fact becomes more
pronounced as ecosystem management, rather than resource-by-resource
management, is expanded. Existing policy on the production of offshore
resources does not strike a balance between current and future
dependency on ocean resources that is acceptable to a broad
constituency. This has created continued legal debate over offshore
drilling and has cast serious doubt about the potential for our existing
policies in this area to achieve sustainability of the ocean.
The lack of an adequate response to the failing health of the ocean is
also due in part to the relative weakness of scientific grounding for
marine management. We are simply far less knowledgeable about the
marine environment than the terrestrial environment. Scholarship aimed
at improving science in marine policymaking identifies certain norms of
environmentally responsible conduct that emerged from the UNCED:
sustainability, biodiversity, the polluter pays principle, and the
precautionary approach to resource use.347 Some scholars have concluded

that recent marine resource management laws have begun to incorporate
more scientific grounding. These scholars have observed trends towards
requiring precautionary and adaptive approaches in decision-making,
demanding that externalities are internalized by those exploiting marine
resources, and recognizing biodiversity preservation as an important

344. Id. at 18.
345. Gunningham et al., supra note 265, at 336-37; David W. Case, Corporate
Environmental Reportingas InformationalRegulation:A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 379,419-22 (2005).

346. Gunningham et al., supra note 265, at 336-37; Case, supra note 345, at 419-22.
347. Richard G. Hildreth et al., Roles for a PrecautionaryApproach to Marine Resources
Management, 19 NATURAL RES. & ENV'T 64, 64-67 (Summer 2004). Sustainability and the
concept of sustainable development have been defined as an approach to natural resource
utilization that meets the needs of humans today without limiting the ability to utilize natural
resources to meet future needs. The polluter pays principle has a German origin. This principle
requires that the cost of addressing pollution either by clean-up or other mitigation measures be
borne by the person or entity who put the material into the environment.
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element of sound law. 348 Two notable ocean and coastal law experts, M.

Casey Jarman and Richard Hildreth, recently identified these changes in
certain laws impacting the ocean, such as the Sustainable Fisheries Act,
the National Environmental Policy Act, and to a lesser degree the Ocean
Dumping Act. 349 But these experts suggest that the movement toward
incorporating environmentally responsible norms of conduct is not
350
discernable in the management of the OCS for oil, gas, and minerals.
We must recognize that our shortcomings in response to failing
ocean health include both a failure of legal response and a failure of
commitment to environmentally responsible norms of conduct. These
principles must come to bear on rig-to-reef projects, which have more
potential to provide public benefit in a legal system that is grounded in
environmentally responsible conduct rather than focused on the special
needs of powerful interest groups.
B.

Alternative Views of Artificial Reef Programs

Concern over ocean dumping has heightened distrust of proposals to
place artificial structures on the seafloor, regardless of evidence of a
laudable purpose. 351 This is simply because, as previously discussed, the
intent to enhance fisheries resources does not do enough to distinguish
artificial reef construction as habitat enhancement rather than ocean
dumping. 352 This is undoubtedly aggravated by the fact that such projects
are often the only alternative to otherwise applicable solid waste disposal
requirements. 353 Notwithstanding these concerns, current rigs-to-reef
programs and policies place too little emphasis on the ecological effects
355
of artificial reefs. 35 4 Performance monitoring continues to be voluntary;
too little effort is extended to ensure that artificial reef permit
requirements are being met; and as such permits frequently lack specific
fisheries enhancement goals, there is no way to measure or quantify the
ecological benefit (if any) of an artificial reef. 356 Although artificial reef
348. Id. at 66.
349. Id.
350. See id. at 67.
351. MacDonald, supra note 14.
352. See supra Part III.A. notes 201-231, and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing
scientific debate); supra Part IV.B, notes 302-321, and accompanying text (discussing the
regulatory focus on marine habitat).
353. See supra Part I.B.3, notes 84-97, and accompanying text (discussing the development
of U.S. law regarding platform removal); supra Part ILA, notes 119-133, and accompanying text
(discussing the exemption for artificial reefs under NFEA).
354. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the National Marine Sanctuary Artificial Reef Policy);
infra Part V.B.2 (discussing California's proposed rigs to reefs legislation).
355.

NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 35.

356. COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4, at 34-36 (discussing the
importance of monitoring); NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at

ENDURING OPTIMISM

2005]

managers recognize these limitations, they continue to express optimism
that their efforts will be fruitful. 357 I contend that given the important
issues at stake, a healthy dose of skepticism must come to bear on
artificial reef efforts.
1.

The National Marine Sanctuary Artificial Reef Policy

Such skepticism is not hard to find. Although Congress endorsed
artificial reef construction by passing NFEA, not all federal agencies with
ocean management responsibilities view artificial reefs as proven fisheries
enhancement tools.
National Marine Sanctuaries are identified by the federal
government as areas with unique and sensitive habitats of national
importance. 358 The National Marine Sanctuaries Program, administered
by the National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, generally forbids the siting of artificial reefs in
sanctuaries, with limited exceptions. 359 The rationale for this general
36
prohibition is that artificial reef science is insufficiently developed. 0 Too
little is known about the design and function of artificial reefs, which
361
poses the risk of negative effects on sanctuary resources.
In contrast to current rig-to-reef programs, the National Marine
Sanctuary Artificial Reef Policy allows an artificial reef project in an
experimental setting only. 362 The proposal must have identified goals for
enhancing sanctuary resources and generate specific reports about the
project's success. 363 Once the project is completed, it is contemplated that
364
Such an
the artificial reef will be removed from the sanctuary.
approach suggests a far more precautionary approach to artificial reefs,
while at the same time driving the generation of scientific research and
information.
An obvious contrast with rig-to-reef conversions is that National
Marine Sanctuaries projects will have more opportunity to measure
impacts from a baseline. Information can be gathered about the
surrounding ecosystem prior to deployment of the artificial structure.
This is much more difficult in state rig-to-reef programs that rely on
357. The Coastal Artificial Reef Plan was drafted to emphasize the use of artificial reefs as
fisheries management tools, and promote their benefits illustrating the continued optimism of
fisheries managers-the contributing authors-of these artificial reef building projects. See
COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4.

358.
359.

National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 (2000).

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id.
Id.
See id.at 4-5 (allowing research, education and in some sanctuaries "management").
Id. at 10-12.
Id.

NOAA, POLICY STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY PROGRAM:
ARTIFICIAL REEF PERMITTING GUIDELINES at i (2003).
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decommissioned oil rigs, where the surrounding environment has been
affected by the presence of the rig and oil drilling at that location. There
is minimal research on low level and cumulative impacts of drilling,
although other environmental impacts are typically discussed in
environmental impact reports, thus baseline conditions are hard to
extrapolate. Some of this information could be generated for other
projects if more scientific resources are committed to evaluating the
environmental effects of oil drilling.
2.

California'sSkepticism of Rig-to-Reef Programs

Perhaps the best illustration of California's skepticism of rig-to-reef
programs is the fate of a recent bill intended to facilitate the inclusion of
offshore oil platforms in California's artificial reef program. Some years
prior to the passage of the NFEA, California's legislature determined
that the decline in certain marine species of fish was a significant issue
facing the state. It therefore created a program to conduct research and
develop innovative solutions to the problem of declining fish species and
promote construction of artificial reefs in conjunction with California's
university system.365 This existing artificial reef program did not accept
platform donations. 366 SB 1, introduced on December 4, 2000,367 was the
third attempt in three years to authorize the conversion of platforms to
artificial reefs in California. 368 SB 1 differed in many important respects
from the laws in place in Louisiana and Texas. The most significant
differences were in the proposed treatment of donor liability, the scaling
of returns from the avoided cost of removal, and the proposed use of the
converted platforms.
In contrast to Gulf of Mexico state programs, SB 1 provided for the
Department of Fish and Game (DFG) to negotiate an indemnity
agreement with the donating company to insulate the state against
liability. 369 SB 1 also included a scaling of returns to the state based on

365. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6420(c) (Deering 2005). The Department of Fish and
Game oversees the placement of artificial reefs in state waters pursuant to the California
Artificial Reef Program. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 6420--6425.
366. MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 58-59 (chronicling California's artificial reef
program); Id. at 62-64 (discussing proposals for rig donations and conversions in California). In
1992, the California Department of Fish and Game rejected a donation of rig materials for an
artificial reef concluding that the materials were not suitable for reefing. Id. at 63.
367. S.B. 1, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2000) (vetoed by Governor Gray Davis, Oct. 13, 2001).
368. See MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 65-66; S.B. 241, 1999-2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999)
(unenacted); S.B. 2173, 1997-1998 Sess. (Cal. 1998) (unenacted).
369. Cal. S.B. 1 § 5 (proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6427(f)(1)(D)): Id.
(proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6427.5) ("[T]he state is indemnified from
any liability that may result from approving the conversion of an offshore oil platform or
production facility as an artificial reef or any liability that may result from the ownership of the
reef.").
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the size of the platform donated. 370 Unlike Gulf of Mexico state
programs, where the amount of decommissioning savings is negotiated on
an ad hoc basis (with the state typically receiving half of the avoided cost
of removal), SB 1 required the donating company to pay 35 percent of
avoided costs in 200 feet or less of water, 50 percent for those in 201 to
400 feet of water, and 65 percent for platforms at depths of more than 400
feet.

371

The most significant different between SB 1 and Gulf of Mexico
state programs, however, was the approach to the goal of using converted
platforms as fishery management tools. First, the DFG was required to
determine that a proposed conversion would "provide a net benefit to the
marine environment compared to the alternative of removing the
facilities from the marine environment. '372 Then, artificial reefs created
from converted platforms would initially be established as "no-take"
373 It
zones, where fish and other marine species could not be harvested.
was contemplated that this restriction might be lifted once specific habitat
enhancement goals were achieved. Thus, unlike the Gulf of Mexico
programs, artificial reefs would not be used for fishing immediately, but
would first be monitored and evaluated to determine whether they were
374
advancing fishery enhancement objectives.
In the end, SB 1 passed through the legislature but was vetoed by the
governor. Governor Davis rejected the bill, explaining that it was
"premature to establish this program until the environmental benefits of
such conversions are widely accepted by the scientific and environmental
communities. '375 This comment was based on scientific studies conducted
in California that failed to produce evidence that platform conversions
benefited regional stocks of marine species. 376 Notably, Governor Davis
vetoed SB 1 even though he was presumably aware that, on the other

370. Id. (proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6429.3(a)).
371. Id. (proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6429.3(a)).
372. Id. (proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6427(b)).
373. Id. § 8 (proposing addition of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30960(b)).
374. Consistent with this aim, one proposed section of S.B. 1 read, "[a~llowing take at
artificial reefs created from offshore oil platforms or production facilities threatens efforts to
improve and restore sports and commercial fishing opportunities in California." Id. § 5
(proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6426.4(a)(3)). Thus, if such a conversion
were approved, the DFG would have been directed to, "prohibit all fishing or removal of any
marine life from the artificial reef and within a reasonable buffer." Take would have been
allowed only for research purposes. Id. (proposing addition of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §
6426.4(b)).
375. Cal. S.B. 1 veto (emphasis added).
376.

See SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at

35 ("[T]here is not any sound scientific evidence (that the Committee is aware of) to support the
idea that platforms enhance (or reduce) regional stocks of marine species.").
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hand, no evidence demonstrates that such structures, if left in place,
would necessarily harm regional stocks of marine species. 377
C.

A Sound and Sustainable Rig-to-Reef Program

A proactive and adaptive approach to reef conversions can be
employed to further sustainability goals rather than impede them. The
uncertainty about the fundamental issue of artificial reef utility
underscores the importance of establishing a framework for addressing
the disposition of defunct oil platforms that is technically, financially, and
politically workable and environmentally sound. 378 The regulatory focus
on managing a waste disposal problem of oil production and encouraging
expanded recreational fishing must adapt to include more robust
evaluation of the environmental benefit the public receives from this
disposition approach.
1. Conforming Goals to Reality-Experimenting, Adapting, and
Removing Ill-sited Platforms
We have yet to reach an acceptable balance between the interests at
stake in the rig-to-reef debate. An intent to enhance fisheries resources,
whether to promote sustained yield from fisheries or to more broadly
advance the restoration of ocean ecosystems, without a concrete set of
goals and monitored results, does not do enough to distinguish these
projects from ocean dumping. Despite this, current rig-to-reef programs
and policies place undue emphasis on the purported purpose of such
projects rather than their effects, blurring the line between ocean
dumping and artificial reefs. Performance monitoring continues to be
voluntary. 379 Rig-to-reef programs must adopt goals and require results to
measure the ecological benefit (if any) of an artificial reef, or accept the
public's intent that ocean dumping of platforms be prohibited.
One starting place for improving current programs is the standard
for initial approval of rig-to-reef projects. The initial approval of rig-toreef projects is a good place to start shifting the perspective about the
utility of artificial reefs toward a more experimental outlook. Debate
over the standard for approval of potential rig-to-reef conversions under
California's rejected SB 1 provides a good illustration of the problem

377. Id.
378. This uncertainty is not dissimilar to other political debates involving scientific
uncertainty and the risk of environmental harm. Some examples include recycling heavy metals
in fertilizers, seeding clouds, and genetic engineering of crops. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The
Science Charadein Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995) (discussing the
"science charade" that agencies use in regulating toxic risk to suggest politically neutral
outcomes based on science rather than value judgment).
379. NOAA DRAFT ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 35.
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with the current approach used in Gulf State programs, which rely in
large part on the good intentions of fisheries managers. SB 1 proposed
that the starting point for a rig-to-reef conversion would be the
conclusion by state fisheries managers that the project would "provide a
net benefit to the marine environment compared to the alternative of
'380 However, based
removing the facilities from the marine environment.
on the state of scientific uncertainty, staff comments regarding SB 1
suggested the bill criteria be amended to reflect the impossible task this
set up for the DFG: "is it possible that the efforts DFG will have to
undertake will be somewhat in vain? According to the best research
available, it is not strictly possible to determine if converting any
particular platform into a reef would produce a net benefit to the marine
381
environment as called for in the bill." Instead, the staff suggested the
DFG consider whether "no significant harm to the marine environment"
382
would come from the proposed project. Although such a standard is
nearly indistinguishable from the environmental considerations required
383
for the issuance of ocean dumping permits for other wastes at sea, it is
a specific objective of NFEA (avoiding harm to marine areas) and such
an approach makes initial approval merely the first step toward
establishing an artificial reef for the enhancement of marine resources.
Given our current knowledge base, the standard should be that the
project would not harm the environment, and the proponent of the
project bears the burden of scientific findings to that effect.
Second, recognizing that good intentions fall far short of enhancing
marine resources, improvement in defining objectives and tracking
progress is required. The NMSP artificial reef policy and California's
rejected SB 1 "no-take" zone approach are helpful models of adaptive
management of artificial reefs. Any particular artificial reef may have
384 Mandatory
different positive as well as potentially injurious effects.
periodic reviews of clearly articulated habitat enhancement goals will
assure permit conditions are being met, but they will also serve another
the ecological benefits, to the
important purpose by helping to illuminate
385
reefs.
extent they exist, of artificial

380. Cal. S.B. 1 § 5, adding CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6427(b).
381. Senate Natural Resources and Wildlife Committee, Bill Analysis, Cal. S.B. 1, at 7.
382. Id.
not
383. Under the MPRSA, approved dumping first determines whether "disposal will
unduly degrade or endanger the marine environment." 40 C.F.R. § 227.4 (2005). MPRSA
site
permits must consider both environmental impact criteria and requirements for disposal
management. 40 C.F.R. § 227.1(a) (2005).
384. McGINNIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 25.
385. See Margaret W. Miller, UsingEcological Processes to Advance Artificial Reef Goals,
with
59 ICES J. MARINE SC. S27, S30 (Oct. 2002) (suggesting vast improvement in successes
artificial reefs would accrue if every artificial reef "were treated as a study reef").
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Artificial reef managers support specific goals and progress reports.
They are just as eager to establish the scientific benefits of artificial reefs
as a management tool as they are interested in avoiding harm from such
projects. 38 6 Artificial reef managers could identify anticipated
benchmarks for success and reasonable timelines for achieving these
benchmarks. Baseline data would be required prior to the establishment
of the artificial reef, and managers would need the flexibility to place the
structures off-limits to fishing and diving during evaluation and
establishment periods. Managers need not be confined to initial
objectives if research illustrates alternative positive benefits. Such an
approach might even consider allowing an artificial reef with only proven
aggregating effects to be used in non-consumptive ways (such as diving or
research) if it is shown to take pressure off natural reefs in the area. This
approach would also provide that those artificial reefs with injurious or
non-beneficial effects (essentially the same as ocean dumping) are
removed. Initial approval of an artificial reef would not ensure its
longevity; proof of its worth in achieving specific goals would be required.
This research mandate would make artificial reef managers accountable
to project objectives as well as their recreational fishing constituency. It
would also facilitate evaluation by the broader public into the uses of
artificial reefs, since it would make clear whether such tools are effective
and efficient, or merely a novelty.
Beyond distinguishing rig-to-reef projects from ocean dumping, a
more robust experimental model is also necessary to keep up with the
growing use of artificial reefs in other contexts. A sound research
approach could pave the way for responsible expansion of the application
of artificial reefs to estuary restoration and as environmental mitigation
for projects that impact marine resources. According to the National
Artificial Reef Plan, "[w]hile the majority of [artificial] reefs have been
built to support and enhance recreational fishing, interest is growing in
using artificial reefs to restore, mitigate, or create habitat...." 387 Since
the science of artificial reefs is still riddled by competing theories,
however, growing efforts to use artificial reefs as a replacement for
natural environments involve significant risk of failure to achieve
environmental goals. Using artificial reefs as habitat mitigation should be

386. See COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supranote 4.
387. NOAA DRAFr ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 2002, supra note 12, at 13. The
original plan
was developed in 1985 by the Secretary of Commerce under direction of the National
Fishing
Enhancement Act of 1984 (NFEA). 33 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000). The original plan
noted that there
was very scant information on how to site reefs to enhance or restore habitat.
"While there is
growing interest in using artificial reefs to enhance or restore fishery resources
and associated
habitat, there is limited research or experience to guide in siting reefs for these
purposes." The
original plan includes those limited recommendations, in the form of some "dos"
and "don'ts."
NOAA ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN OF 1985, supra note 44, at 7.
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much more rigorously scrutinized until the science of artificial reefs is
better understood. The popularity of artificial reefs with the public is not
likely to wane unless information about the effects of artificial reefs is
better understood and disseminated.
Expanding scientific scrutiny of rig-to-reef projects cannot be done
without empowering artificial reef managers with the staff and funding
they require. To obtain flexibility in removal requirements, industry
should be required to offer tangible benefits to the environment that are
as meaningful as their obligation to remove defunct industrial fixtures.
Without staff to study and monitor the effects of artificial reefs, this basic
evaluation simply cannot occur.
An increase in transparency would be a step toward obtaining
benefit from the rig-to-reef option without continuing to burden coastal
states with under-funded cleanup subsidy programs. Transparency in rigto-reef transactions would be significantly enhanced if the monetary
value of the prospective artificial reef habitat and the cost to the state of
accepting the conversion, as opposed to just the cost of removal, were
388
calculated as part of the proposal. This change in perspective would
help to illuminate the fact that it is far more expensive to manage an
unproven technology, which still requires scientific research and
monitoring, than an established technology. Unlike many other
environmental commodities, artificial reef construction materials have a
known economic value. The monetized value of habitat enhancement
the
from artificial reefs, however, is speculative, particularly given
389 While
scientific uncertainty surrounding artificial reefs altogether.
difficult to calculate, estimations of habitat value would help the public
understand whether and why such investments are necessary. Potentially
useful calculation tools could include using environmental baselines
(evaluating what habitat exists before the project and comparing it with
the habitat that is anticipated to be created with the project) or referring
39°
to the cost of restoration or replacement habitat. Illumination of the
388. MacDonald, supra note 14.
389. There would be many components of such a calculation, with some much easier to
monetize than others. Artificial reef construction materials have a known economic value.
Economic benefits from tourism, the costs of maintenance, managing liability and the costs of
insurance policies to secure against such risks can all be estimated with some degree of precision.
It is more difficult, however, to value the resulting artificial reef habitat. Other costs difficult to
estimate include the cost of the structure standing as an obstruction to navigation, the risk of
movement, and the risk of harm to the environment including the potential that decomposition
will release pollution in the ocean as well as the value of returning the ocean floor as near to its
pre-drilling state as possible.
390. Identifying natural areas of ecological significance and then calculating the cost to
duplicate these areas is still a controversial issue. The debate over valuation of natural areas has
been extensively played out in the context of natural resources damage litigation under
CERCLA. Some tools used to make these calculations include contingent valuation, where
surveys of respondents are used to calculate what a person would pay for the resource. Sletto,
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speculative nature of habitat value gained and the need to evaluate the
ecological effect of these efforts (including the possibility of ultimate
platform removal funded by the state) will strengthen states' arguments
that increased revenue sharing from OCS operations and increased
influence over OCS activities are long overdue.
2.

Aligning Goals and Sharing Responsibilities

Federal and state objectives for OCS activities must be reconciled, or
rig-to-reef programs will continue to suffer from obscure goals and
ineffective results. Federal acknowledgement of this issue at the outset of
offshore development decision-making is required. The level of
government best suited to deal with an environmental problem should be
charged with responsibility for such problem. 391 Here, the federal
government trustee can best avoid the waste disposal problem created by
its permitted OCS development projects 392 and should be looked to for
393
leadership.
The federal government, which receives financial benefits from OCS
development, has control over the bargain struck with the oil industry at
the outset. Even if state programs are well-intentioned, federal objectives
must be aligned with state objectives to achieve the best "bargain" from
the entire operation from start (OCS leasing), to re-start (artificial reef
conversion). If indeed the. federal government's intent is to subsidize oil
and gas production, this objective can be accomplished with royalty
relief 394 or bonus bid reductions 395 at or during production rather than
shifting the focus of financial support to the cleanup stage. Involvement
of the federal government in reef programs could also pave the way to
more extensive research in deepwater areas where effective rig-to-reef

supra note 293, at 583-85 (discussing proposal for environmental baseline
to be included in
OCSLA process).

391. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
392. See discussion of state and federal competition on the OCS infra Part II.B.
393. Currently, the direction for rig-to-reef policy, according to MMS, will be dictated
in
large part by stakeholders. See DAUTERIVE, supra note 199, at 5. If the past is any indication
of
the future, this will be dominated by the diverse coalition of recreationists and the oil industry.
394. The federal government receives a payment based on the amount of oil or
gas
produced from a certain lease. The federal government could choose to reduce the amount
of
the payment if it is interested in encouraging development. This approach was taken
to spur
deepwater drilling. See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of
1995, 43
U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(C)(ii) (2000).
395. The federal government also obtains a lump sum or "bonus" bid at the outset
of
negotiations on the sale of offshore leases. Such bonus bid sums, often quite substantial,
could be
reserved and returned to oil companies to mitigate the cost of platform removal. See 43
U.S.C. §
1337(a) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to fix an amount for a cash bonus).
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development might require a trade-off that involves impacts to
3
navigation. 96
Whether a platform will be removed is now determined on a case-bycase basis. One purported justification for this discretionary approach is
that platforms are not generally designed for complete removal, making it
expensive as well as technically infeasible in some instances to remove a
platform. Based on the current rig-to-reef practice, the deeper the
397
platform the more likely it is to be "recycled" as a reef. It is well known
that "[t]o reduce deepwater structure decommissioning, operators want
to be allowed to dispose of the structures by sinking them and turning
'398
The technological advances of constructing
them into artificial reefs.
platforms in deeper waters have outpaced technological advances to
remove platforms safely and inexpensively. This occurred in a regulatory
context where platform operators had already committed to removal,
illustrating an unreasonably short-sighted business operation. This
situation must be halted. There is no reason technical feasibility should
control removal decisions given the significant financial wealth generated
in these operations. Platforms can and should be designed for complete
removal; an up-front design requirement in federal leases (as advocated
by the IMO) would shift the focus of the offshore disposal399debate to

considerations important to the public, rather than to industry.

396. Some scientific research suggests that allowing rig-to-reef marine communities to stay
undisturbed near the surface of the water has more potential for environmental benefit than
toppling rigs or cutting them down. See SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON
DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 11, at 29-31 (discussing removal of all or the upper 30 meters of
a rig structure). The authors noted that organisms that live on the top of the structure and
depend on a significant amount of light and nutrients would not be present in deeper areas, and
removal would have an impact on marine life lower down in the water column. Id. at 30. They
propose that, "The removal of the top portion of the platform may have great effects on the
biota on the lower part, and over the long term that assemblage may not be sustained." Id. See
also Weiss, supra note 9 (noting that scientists debate the benefits of rig-to-reef conversions);
feet
PULSIPHER & DANIEL, supra note 47, at 19 (noting that research shows the first 80-100
below water is critical). The Department of Interior, Coast Guard, and other federal actors will
have to be involved in expressing their support for such trade-offs, providing a good indication
of federal support for marine ecosystem enhancement through the use of artificial reefs.
397. At a public workshop discussing decommissioning, Associate Director for Offshore
Minerals Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, Carolita Kallaur noted that "[i]n the
Gulf of Mexico, statistics show that the greater the water depth the more likely decommissioned
structures are to be converted to artificial reefs ....However, 40% of the structures located in
100-200 feet of water, and 85% of the structures located in 200-400 feet of water have been
converted to artificial reefs." DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE CALIFORNIA, supra note 1, at 10.
398. Ron Twachtman, Offshore-PlatformDecommissioningPerceptionsChange, OIL & GAS
J., Dec. 8, 1997, at 38.
399. This standard was suggested over thirty years ago when the Secretary of Defense
recommended such standard be discussed interagency, due to concerns about the proliferation of
abandoned platforms harming U.S. marine defenses ("seaborne forces"). COMM'N ON
DISPOSITION, supra note 2, at Appendix C, Position of the Department of Defense. Moreover,
MMS looked favorably on this requirement when raised again in response to comments over
revision of platform installation regulations in 2000. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in
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This design requirement could also be paired with a firm goal for the
number of platforms that will be left in the ocean for use as artificial reefs
or other purposes. This would do much to address the concern about the
proliferation of platforms on the seabed and provide state artificial reef
managers with better ability to plan for the development of their
programs. Again, this points to the need for increased federal attention
and involvement at initial lease stages to prevent a waste disposal
problem, particularly since the federal government is poised to approve a
proliferation of more permanent fixed structures on the OCS for energy
development, aquaculture, and research. 4 0
States already have a recognized important role in managing coastal
zone activities. 401 A tool to enable the federal government and the states
to implement a long-term vision of ocean use and sustainability must be
fostered. An obvious candidate is the increased use of ocean zoning to
establish not only short term uses for particular ocean areas, but also
long-term sustainability.
D.

MarineProtectedAreas Could Mediate Among
Conflicting Ocean Uses

An effective regulatory tool increasingly used to manage ocean
ecosystems is the Marine Protected Area (MPA). 40 2 The MPA is a form
of ocean zoning that considers all activities in a particular area of the
ocean. 4° 3 This holistic ecosystem approach has been employed by the
federal government and several states in response to the limitations of
traditional regulatory tools to achieve marine management goals, such as
individual fishing quotas, catch limits, gear restrictions, and seasonal

the Outer Continental Shelf-Decommissioning Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,892, 41,893 (July 7,
2000) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
400. The Bush administration has proposed to increase authority over OCS structures.
BUSH RESPONSE, supra note 101, at 24. Congress has in fact increased DOI's authority for
offshore energy development on the OCS. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §
388, 119 Stat. 594, 744-47 (2005) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1337) (amending section 8 of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of Interior to issue "leases,
easements, or rights-of-way" on the OCS if such activities "use, for energy-related purposes or
for other authorized marine-related purposes, facilities currently or previously used for activities
authorized under this Act ... ").
401. OCEAN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 20, at 473-74 (recommending increased
partnerships with coastal states).
402. See Exec. Order No. 13,158, 65 Fed. Reg. 34,909 (May 26, 2000) (encouraging the
adoption of MPA management); NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, MARINE PROTECTED

AREAS: TOOLS FOR SUSTAINING OCEAN ECOSYSTEMS (2001); Craig, supra note 330, at 167-68;
Christie, supra note 322, at 430 (discussing marine reserves as complement to ecosystemmanagement).
403. Neubert, supra note 159.
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closures. 4° 4 The MPA is one regulatory tool that could be used to ensure
that federal and state objectives are achieved on the OCS through mutual
agreement over the hierarchy of uses (or non-use) best suited to
particular areas of the ocean. For instance, one proponent of this
approach suggests specific areas, like the Gulf of Mexico, should be
zoned for minerals extraction and any compatible uses such as
recreational fishing. 4°5 While a suggestion like this might seem dramatic
to some, policymakers have recognized the limitations of multiple-use
management in an open access system and are looking for ways to
expand exploitation of ocean resources without creating additional user
conflicts. 4°6 The MPA approach is particularly suitable to managing fixed
structures on the OCS, as such structures have place-based certainty and
are likely to have local effects.
The most restrictive form of an MPA is the marine reserve, which
47
prohibits all extractive activities in the defined reserve area. 0 In addition
to providing relief to overfished stocks, the marine reserve approach
4°8
ensures that habitat is not damaged physically by fishing activities. By
using artificial reefs in reserve areas, much like California SB 1 proposed,
scientific information about artificial reef capacity to improve or harm
marine ecosystems and particular species of fish could be generated.
While the use of artificial reefs in marine protected areas is currently
rare, reef managers note it "may be one of the most underutilized
applications for artificial reefs."' 4 9 Certainly, it has much more promise to
produce reliable scientific evidence about the effects of artificial reefs on

404. NATIONAL MARINE PROTECTED AREAS CENTER, NOAA PROGRESS REPORT:
STATUS OF MPA EXECUTIVE ORDER 13158 AND NATIONAL MARINE PROTECTED AREAS

CENTER FISCAL YEAR 2002 AND 2003 (July 2004). The federal government coordinates MPA
information. See MPA.gov, Marine Managed Area Programs and Systems in States,
Commonwealths, and Territories, http://mpa.gov/mpa-programs/state-programs.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2005) (listing the coastal states that are using some form of MPA or marine
managed area s to govern ocean resources).
405. Harb, supra note 61, at 27.
406. See Exec. Order No. 13,158 (recognizing the importance of solving emerging user
conflicts, threats to ocean sustainability, and the need for protecting areas of the ocean from
human impacts). See also Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through
Mooring Lines: Time ForMore Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States' Coastal Waters?, 4
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1 (1999) (analyzing solutions for improving ocean management given
increasing use conflicts); Roger Fleming, Peter Shelley & Priscilla M. Brooks, Twenty-Eight
Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on its Conservation Promise?,28 VT.
L. REV. 579, 610 (2004) (discussing increasing uses of oceans); Id. at 619-21 (discussing network
of marine protected areas to conserve marine habitat).
407. See Craig, supra note 330, at 169-72 (discussing the benefits of marine reserves).
408.

Id.

409.

COASTAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 4, at 15.
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the surrounding environment than those artificial reefs constantly utilized
410
by recreationists.
Most coastal states have already begun to experiment with the MPA
approach to marine life and habitat conservation. 411 The most aggressive
of these efforts is unfolding in California, with the Marine Life Protection
Act (MLPA) establishing an extended network of marine protected areas
along the entire California coastline. 412 As part of an overarching strategy
to protect ocean resources, California also continues to promote the
complete moratorium on offshore oil drilling. 413 This effort illustrates the
importance of shared environmental objectives between the federal
government and coastal states to achieve sustainability of the ocean: an
effort such as the MLPA could never be truly effective if the federal
government pursued its own interests in risk-laden OCS development on
4 14
the adjacent OCS.
Of course, MPAs, and in particular no-take marine reserves, are
fiercely criticized. The most vocal opponents are fishing interests that
contend zoning the ocean displaces traditional rights of use.415 MPA
opponents cite the traditional "right to fish" and have even moved states
to adopt "freedom to fish" legislation to limit the ability of fisheries
managers to regulate recreational fishing. 416 Some have suggested the
solution to ocean zoning opposition is collaboration between fishermen
and fisheries managers. The success of MPAs, particularly marine
reserves, has thus far hinged on stakeholder acceptance of this new
management tool. 417 Securing this acquiescence will require proven
results of the efforts undertaken to restore ocean ecosystems or specific
410. The Coastal Artificial Reef Planning Guide suggests that the lack of baselines poses a
serious shortcoming to artificial reef management efforts, to the extent they exist at all. Id. at 36.
411. See sources cited supra note 404.
412. One of the first initiatives in this larger plan is implementation of the Marine Life
Protection Act, adopted by the California legislature in 1999, which calls for a network of MPAs
along the entire coastline. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2850-2863 (Deering 2005).
413.

CAL. RES. AGENCY, PROTECTING OUR OCEAN: CALIFORNIA'S ACTION STRATEGY,

FINAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER iii, 36 (Sept. 2004).
414. The reverse may also be true in areas where federal efforts to restore marine
ecosystems conflict with state activities. See Craig, supra note 336, at 658-664 (predicting that
potential conflicts between state and federal goals may undermine environmental protections).
415. See Christie, supra note 322, at 431 (noting that the most frequent criticism of marine
reserves is violation of public trust doctrine).
416. Freedom to Fish Acts were proposed in most coastal states by recreational fishing
groups. See, e.g., Kelly McGrath, The Feasibility of Using Zoning to Reduce Conflicts in the
Exclusive Economic Zone, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 183, 212 (discussing the Freedom to Fish
campaigns of sportfishing organizations). In 2003, 11 states introduced Freedom to Fish Acts.
See, e.g., S.B. 281, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (unenacted); H.B. 2205, 2003-2004 Biennium
(Wash. 2003) (unenacted); H 5686A, 2003 Sess. (R.I. 2003) (enacted); H.B. 1160, 2003 Sess. (Md.
2003) (unenacted); H.R. 313, 2003 Sess. (Pa. 2003) (passed).
417. See Craig, supra note 330, at 261 (underscoring need for public support for successful
MPA management).
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fisheries. Stakeholders are likely to accept change only if there has been a
satisfactory demonstration that sacrifices have been secured toward a
common goal.
CONCLUSION

Adapting rig-to-reef programs to a more environmentally sound
approach requires national planning and an experimental outlook on
these projects as unproven fisheries management tools. Rig-to-reef
programs currently subsidize unsustainable practices, improve the ability
to extract fish rather than improve ocean ecosystems, and misplace
reliance on corporate generosity. At worst, these projects are nothing
more than legally-approved garbage dumping that attracts fish away from
valuable fisheries habitat. Even if artificial reefs are a net environmental
wash, states expend limited resources for recreational benefit at a time
when the ocean's health is in crisis. The importance of achieving a
sustainable ocean resource demands that the vacuum created by scientific
uncertainty, and in turn legal uncertainty, is not dominated by political
expediency, profiteering, or sheer inertia. Instead, rig-to-reef programs
must employ a strong commitment to improving the health and
functioning of important ocean ecosystems to resist the powerful
influence of profitable oil companies and the enduring optimism of
recreational fishermen.
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